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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Humans evolved over millennia into agents that invest heavily, both 
directly and indirectly, in their children. Part of the investment into 
children is represented by contributions to long-run public goods, 
including the educational system, the health-care system, major 
infrastructures and environmental protection. Moreover, the production of 
some of these public goods has wide-ranging externalities to local or global 
communities (think of vaccination programs, for example). 
 
This Doctoral Thesis is a collection of three essays on the topic of long-run, 
across-the-border public goods, from the vantage point of Experimental 
and Behavioral Economics. The first Chapter reviews the literature up to 
date, re-organizing previous works on Public Good games for the benefit of 
explaining why intergenerational and international public goods are 
different from standard ones. The second and third Chapters provide 
empirical evidence on matters such as heterogeneity linked to seniority and 
dynastic membership in the provision of public goods. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Over the past 30 years, experimental economics has extensively proven that 
the classical economic assumption that describes agents as solely driven by the 
maximization of monetary incentives is a scientific artifact. When other motivations 
enter the picture of economic decision-making, outcomes tend to deviate from those 
predicted by standard economic models. 
Behavioral and experimental economics contributed to the modification of the 
traditional rationalistic paradigms in economics, particularly those related to 
unbounded rationality, complete self-control and pure self-interest. Amongst many 
fundamental findings (such as Simon’s Bounded Rationality, Kahneman and Tversky 
Prospect Theory, again Kahneman Dual-System Theory, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
status quo bias, Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue time discounting etcetera) 
those linked to the social dimension of the economic behavior are attracting more and 
more research projects. 
True is that individuals are shaped and embedded in social environments, and 
therefore social forces affect their decision-making. Topics such as fairness and 
reciprocity, trust and dishonesty, commitment and social norms have been largely 
investigated and researchers in the field have produced a vast amount of literature 
showing the extent of the influence of social preferences. 
However Behavioral and Experimental Economics have only recently started to 
look into issues related to intergenerational dynamics. More specifically pushing the 
edge of the envelope by considering aspects already studied by biology and 
anthropology could prove to help explaining why, for example, individuals care so 
much about environmental issues or charitable giving. Humans evolved over millennia 
into agents that invest heavily, both directly and indirectly, in their children. Part of 
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this investment is represented by contributions to long-run public goods, including 
the educational system, the health-care system, major infrastructures and 
environmental protection. Moreover, the production of some of these public goods has 
wide-ranging externalities to local or global communities (think of vaccination 
programs, for example).  
These are the type of public goods that are dealt with in this Doctoral Thesis 
from the point of view and using the tools of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 
The first chapter, titled Genes, Generations and Nations in Public Goods 
Experiments – A Critical Evaluation of the Experimental Literature, aims at portraying 
a picture of the state of the art of the Experimental literature on intergenerational and 
international public goods (PG). By characterizing the structure of standard PG games 
and extending the classic taxonomy of PG, the chapter lays the first stone for the 
identification of new challenges surrounding future Experimental research. In 
addition, the literature available to date is scanned and organized to serve the purpose 
of highlighting specific promising future developments and identifying valid methods 
and tools that can be re-applied to the aforementioned advances.  
Chapter 2, Helping Out the Young and Inexperienced: an Experimental 
Approach to Generational Heterogeneity and Redistribution in Public Good Games, 
proposes a model that explains how equilibrium in a PG game is reached when 
heterogeneity linked to seniority and strategic interaction is finitely repeated. Within 
this model the case of financial aid schemes for economic development is explained 
using a redistribution rule that benefits the younger players, as a compensation for 
their inexperience. Experimental evidence shows that subjects who belong to low or 
middling marginal per capita return types are negatively affected by heterogeneity, 
whereas groups benefit from the presence of experienced subjects. In other words, 
when a public good is generated and benefits more the young and inexperienced 
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individuals, social comparison mechanism play a role in shaping the levels of 
contribution to the PG. Some critical pointers for policy makers are also presented at 
the end of the chapter. 
Chapter 3, Grandparents Matter: Perspectives on Intergenerational Altruism - 
An Experiment on Family Dynamic Spillovers in Public Goods Games, presents the 
results of an experiment that aspires to mimic PG intergenerational dynamics, not 
only from an economic point of view but also from a biological one. The experiment 
considers the case where a PG is produced by one generation of individuals and the 
following cohort partially reaps the benefits of it. Within this model the case of 
intergenerational public goods production is explained using a spillover rule, where a 
percentage of the public good produced in time t by experimental parents will 
integrate the endowment of their Artefactual children in t+1. A cascade mechanism 
allows also for the rebirth of three generations of players, mimicking the biological 
and anthropological mechanisms of gene transmission and intergenerational altruism. 
Results shows that subjects who are reminded of their lineage membership tend to 
contribute more compared to those who are not included in a dynastic model. More 
importantly, evidence displays that the real dynastic background of individuals is a 
prominent influence in the levels of investment in public goods.  
Lastly, section Concluding Remarks, besides briefly summarizing the results of 
the experiments and the limitations of the study, emphasizes some of the potential 
lines of future research on international and intergenerational PG.  
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Chapter 1  - Genes, Generations and Nations in 
Public Good Experiments –  A Critical Evaluation of  
the Experimental Literature 
 
1.1 – Introduction  
The creation and redistribution of resources across ages and geographical areas 
has been a central issue throughout human history. However in recent years the 
complexity of the matter has been escalating.  
For the industrial world this is due to change in the shape of population age 
distribution, the alteration of dependent economic life cycles and the adjustment of 
the institutional context and the State functions (Lee et al., 2008). Firstly, the sheer 
trends in ageing, fertility changes (such as baby booms, bust and declines) and 
mortality affect the average national old age dependency ratio (65+/20-64). In addition 
the major population ageing has yet to come, with future claims of the elderly over 
founded and unfounded old age support systems. The age-structural transition 
witnessed in the last century and continuing well into the 21st century has had strong 
repercussions on the economic climate and future economic activity, particularly on 
the demand and production of public goods and the flow of such goods across 
different ages of the human life cycle (Tuljapurkar et al., 2007). Adding to this already 
complex scenario, the classic challenges surrounding the production and distribution 
of PG (such as free-riding and the tragedy of the commons) still exist in the 
intergenerational and international set-ups.  
The production of public goods (PG) regards a wide range of fields such as 
peace and security, health, environmental and cultural heritage, knowledge and 
information, equity and justice, and market efficiency. These PG cross not only 
generational boarders but also National borders. The example of the eradication of 
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smallpox is enlightening1. In 1960s smallpox was endemic in more than 30 Countries, 
and represented one of the world’s most devastating diseases, with over 130.000 
reported cases a year (that could have represented only 5% of the total number of 
cases), a 30-35% mortality rate and long term consequences for those who survived 
(blindness, scarring, deformities). An estimated 300 million people died in the 20th 
century due to smallpox. In 1966 the World Health Assembly voted for a special 
budget to be allocated for the eradication of the disease. While for Western Coutries 
vaccination was sufficient, for Developing Countries a program of surveillance and 
containment assisted vaccination. Thanks to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
systematic efforts the last wild case of human variola major was registered in 1975 
and the last wild case of human variola minor was registered in 1977 in Somalia. In 
1980 the WHO declared smallpox eradicated2. The campaign for the elimination of 
smallpox is a good example of an intergenerational and international PG, and its 
challenges, for several reasons: firstly, it paved the way for today’s concept of global 
health; secondly, it shows that concerted and adapted efforts across borders benefit 
the whole international community; thirdly, since we do not vaccinate anymore for 
smallpox and there hasn’t been any wild case since 1978, future generations are also 
free from the disease; lastly, it showed that the last countries to harbor a disease are 
the “weak-link” in eradication programme.  
 
Even tough most of these changes and increase in complexity have been in the 
making for decades only recently the accumulating effects have reached the attention 
threshold for both researchers and policy-makers. Since public policy is often used to 
                                                
1 Eradicating a pest or a disease is a public good since it has nonrival and nonexcludable benefits. In most 
cases (i.e. smallpox, malaria, poliomyelitis, etcetera) these transcend both national and generational 
borders. Smallpox is an intense infection due to a virus from the orthopoxvirus family, i.e. the variola 
virus. 
2 All information regarding the timeline of smallpox eradication is available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/en/. 
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persuade individuals to contribute to public goods when their private incentive is to 
free-ride or abuse the common resources, it is vital to explore how individuals behave 
when time and space dimensions are added to the circumstances surrounding PG 
production and distribution.  To achieve this goal, and advise policy makers on how to 
improve institutions, behavioral economist employ laboratory experiments. 
Unfortunately the experimental literature has not fully adjusted to the complexity of 
the issue and a critical literature review could help researchers in their quest for 
gaining insight into how intergenerational and international PG should be produced 
and redistributed. 
More specifically the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the following 
questions: what are the peculiarities of intergenerational and international PG games? 
In what do they differ from standard PG games? 
In order to bring more evidence to bear on this question the chapter examines 
2 strands of the literature on PG games that have developed simultaneously: the first 
one looks into the extent of the introduction of families and intergenerational 
interactions into PG experiments, while the seconds looks into local and global public 
good games. In the process of examining the existing literature we highlight several 
open questions.  
The chapter is structured as follows: section 1.2 looks into the definition and 
taxonomy of PG games; section 1.3 contains the critical survey of the experimental 
literature, looking into specific aspects of intergenerational and international PG 
games; concluding remarks follow in section 1.4. 
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1.2 – Definitions and Taxonomy 
1.2.1 – Classic Taxonomy and Old Challenges 
 
Following Samuelson’s definition (1954), public goods are goods with two 
properties: they are non-rival and non-excludable. In other words, once they are 
produced an additional consumer can consume them at no additional cost, and 
consumers cannot be excluded from consumption once public goods are produced. 
The degree and extent of such properties determines the type of public good. In the 
classic literature public goods are divided in pure and impure. The former are those 
that are completely non-excludable and non-rival. The latter are characterized by the 
fact that individuals’ benefit depends on number of users because of congestion. 
Impure public goods could be of two kinds:  club goods, when consumption is non-
rivalrous up to a certain number of users, but subject to congestion thereafter and 
exclusion is possible; or common pool resources (CPR), when consumption is non-
rivalrous up to a certain number of users, but subject to congestion thereafter and 
exclusion is impossible.  
 
Figure 1.1 – Classic Taxonomy of Public Goods 
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Some examples of public goods include pollution abatement, national defense, 
mass-transit systems, school systems, and etcetera. Examples of club goods are private 
parks or satellite television, while common property examples fish-stocks, or 
irrigation systems. 
Public goods have been systematically studied by various disciplines in the 
social sciences and ever since the very early economic theoretical models (Samuelson, 
1954, and McMillan, 1979) contribution problems have been identified and posed 
serious challenges for the sustainability of the necessary cooperation behind the 
production of public goods. In particular free riding and the “tragedy of the commons” 
have attracted the attention of researchers. Free riding is a well-known phenomenon 
that takes place when an individual is able to obtain the benefits of a good without 
contributing to the relative costs of production. In the case of a public good, since the 
provider cannot exclude from the consumption of the good, the problem is even more 
relevant. Buchanan (1968) described the free riding problem in his seminal work: 
It may prove almost impossible […] to secure agreement among a large 
number of persons, and to enforce such agreements as are made. The 
reason for this lies in the "free rider" position in which each individual 
finds himself. While he may recognize that similar independent 
behavior on the part of everyone produces undesirable results, it is not 
to his own interest to enter voluntarily into an agreement since, for him, 
optimal results can be attained by allowing others to supply the public 
good to the maximum extent while he enjoys a "free ride"; that is, 
secures the benefits without contributing to the costs. Even if an 
individual should enter into such a cost-sharing agreement, he will have 
a strong incentive to break his own contract, to chisel on the agreed 
terms. 
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Similarly, for common resources, it is in the interests of all producers to hold 
down output with the intention of preserving the common resource, while the interest 
of the single producer is to increase output when others restrain production.  
 
1.2.2 – New Challenges: Intergenerational and International Public Goods 
Intergenerational public goods provide benefits across generations and such 
benefits are non-rival and non-excludable both within and among generations 
(Sandler, 1999). Examples are eradicating a disease, limiting ozone shield depletion, 
building major infrastructures, and preserving local biodiversity.   
On the other hand, when public goods have wide-ranging benefit spillovers to 
the global community they are called global or transnational public goods. While 
transnational public goods involve more than one country, global public goods involve 
the entire world. However global public goods are further complicated because their 
production could be done either at the national, transnational or global level, 
independently from the location of the beneficiaries. In other words they are non-rival 
and non-excludable both within and among their geographical extension.  
Summing up, intergenerational and international public goods are goods with 
benefits that extend beyond the borders of a single Country and/or benefit the next 
generations, and are therefore non-rival and non excludable within and among these 
two dimensions. Therefore the social dilemmas surrounding standard PG games are 
extended both geographically and temporarily. This means, for example, that 
intergenerational public goods depend not only on the ability of the current cohort to 
cooperate but also on the extent of their care for the future generations. 
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1.3 – Critical Survey of the Experimental Literature 
1.3.1 – Stylized Facts on Standard PG Experiments 
 
Many theories predict what it should expected from public goods experiments, 
and although it has long been accepted that the traditional microeconomic and game 
theoretic prediction of complete self-interest (and full free-riding) cannot explain the 
data of a vast experimental literature, there is not an unambiguous and 
comprehensive theory that can predict results with certainty. This is mostly due to the 
complexity of public goods: experimental research has to simplify in order to 
transpose the reality of production and consumption of public goods into the 
laboratory, and by doing so only some effects can be isolated, ignoring potential cross-
effects. Nevertheless the literature reports on how private contributions to public 
goods vary with treatment parameters such as repetition, heterogeneity in 
endowments and returns, punishment, communication etcetera.  
The foundation of experimental research on the private provision of public 
goods is the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). The typical setup has subjects 
allocated into groups of size N (generally between 3 and 5), and each individual is 
endowed with a definite amount of experimental currency unit (ECU) denoted with zi. 
The private good contributed (t) by the i-th individual is used to produce the public 
good following a production function Y =f(Σti) where ti is the amount of private good 
contributed by each individual in order to produce Y. The production function f(Σti) 
represents the benefits from cooperation before being equally divided among all N 
group members. The outcome of a public good experiment consists of two items: a 
level of public good Y and a reallocation for each agent x1, ..., xN. Player’s i’s individual 
payoff, πi, equals: πi = zi - ti + (a+bδi) Σti, where (a+bδi) is the decomposition of the 
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marginal per capita return (MPCR) with δi being an individual productivity factor. If 
1/N < (a+bδi) < 1 the game is a social dilemma. 
Given the structure of the payoff function the equilibrium predictions are 
identical for one-shot and repeated games: the unique dominant strategy equilibrium 
is for all players to fully free-ride, contributing zero to the group account. In other 
words, following conventional microeconomics and game theory, the public good will 
not be produced and consumed, since all individuals will hold their full endowment in 
their private accounts. On the other hand the social optimum is reached when all 
individuals contribute their endowment to the group account: the public good will be 
produced and consumed by all individuals who will not retain any endowment into 
their private account. 
Neither of these two predictions are however observed when subjects play 
public good games: on average, in one shot public good games contributions are 
around 40-60% of the endowment, while on repeated public goods they decrease over 
time towards a free-riding solution (0-30%) but without reaching the one-shot 
dominant strategy of full free-riding (Marwell and Ames, 1979; Ledyard, 1995). In 
other words subjects tend to split their endowment between the private and the 
public account. There is a considerable subject heterogeneity since systematic 
differences are registered between individuals that consistently contribute and some 
never do, while others switch from not contributing to contributing (Palfrey and 
Prisbrey 1997, Brandts and Schram, 2001).  
Contribution levels are further influenced by various factors: group size, 
different MPCR, number of repetitions, heterogeneity of endowment, communication 
and punishments, just to name the most relevant.  
Groups that are held constant through periods show concentrated 
contributions as the experiment progresses (Brandts and Schram, 2001). Another 
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element of relevance in public good games is the heterogeneity in endowment and 
MPCR. For what concerns the effect of endowment asymmetry the results are mixed: 
some studies have shown an increase in cooperation (Chan et al. 1996, 1999; Buckley 
and Croson, 2006), while others found a reduction (Anderson et al. 2008, Cherry et al. 
2005). On the other hand if heterogeneity is linked to public or private accounts the 
results are consistent. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), for example, by assigning subjects 
different rates of return for their private accounts found that when the opportunity 
cost of public contribution is increased through greater returns to the private good, 
cooperation rates are lower. Fisher et al. (1995) examine heterogeneity by changing 
the marginal per capita return (MPCR) within groups. In this case subjects with high-
MPCR contribute more to PG compared to low-MPCR ones. Further complicating the 
influence of MPCR on PG contributions is the awareness of such heterogeneity. When 
subjects are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions increase in general. But, high-
MPCR types give more than low-MPCR types when contributions can be associated to 
the type of the donor but give less otherwise. When contributions cannot be linked to 
the types of subjects but individuals are aware of the heterogeneity, low-MPCR types 
give more than high types. Recent extension of the experimental research on public 
goods has studied other regarding preferences and reciprocity (see Fehr and Gätcher 
2000 for an overview): individuals tend to reciprocate others’ behavior but when 
punishment is available free riders are heavily punished by cooperating individuals, 
even if the punishment has a cost and does not provide material benefits to those who 
punish. 
Given this brief general background on standard PG games it is clear that 
emotions, limits to rationality, social and cultural influences that are thought to 
influence voluntary giving towards a common project in the real world are having an 
effect also in experiments. Moreover these observations can be extend beyond the 
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classic take into intergenerational and international public goods. Although a standard 
VCM experiment does not capture the whole dynamics of intergenerational and 
international public goods, past literature has already moved some steps towards a 
greater understanding of such mechanisms.  
In the following sections previous studies on generations and global and local 
public goods will be presented in order to gather the exponentially growing literature 
and provide a framework from where further research can stem3. 
 
1.3.2 – Generations in Public Good Experiments 
The overlapping generations model (OLG) was first introduced by Samuelson 
(1958), then reprised by Diamond (1965), and has since become a standard tool in 
economics to explain phenomena such as welfare systems, tax policies and the 
provision of public goods. Simplifying, the greatest innovation introduced with the 
OLG model is the turnover in the population: since new individuals are continually 
born, and old individuals are continually dying, a range of new economic interactions 
is established. Of particular relevance is the fact that the decisions of the older 
generations affect younger ones, therefore the central question regards the conditions 
under which the overall efficient and cooperative equilibrium can be reached and 
sustained. On the other hand it is important to note that individuals that aim at 
reaching an OLG cooperative equilibrium expose themselves to the possibility that 
their successors defect.  
Experimental investigations of the OLG model can use various design 
mechanisms, depending of course on the focus of the research. However, in order to 
                                                
3 For an extensive literature review of the early studies and major stylized facts see Ledyard (1995), 
Zelmer (2003) and Laury and Holt (2008). 
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realistically portray the social dilemma of long-lived public goods, the essential unit of 
the design of experimental OLG models is the carryover mechanism. Most of the 
current research on repeated PG games is still lacking a valid mechanism that links 
decision-making processes across periods. More specifically, since contributions to a 
group account may be left available from one period to the following and therefore 
impact the effective endowment of subjects, the basic constitutional unit of any OLG 
PG game should be some form of carryover, either strictly downwards (from parent to 
offspring) or bidirectional (from parent to children and vice versa).  
Cadigan et al. (2011) are the first to study the influence of carryover on 
contributions to a common project in a two-stage VCM game. The authors envisage 
two different types of carryover: one affecting the endowment and one impacting the 
MPCR. While the ratio behind the first scenario is clear (PG sometimes are available in 
the long run) the idea behind the second treatment is more sophisticated: organizing 
and producing public goods could impact the costs of future similar projects, 
specifically in terms of experience and learning-by doing, and consequently influence 
the MPCR (the efficiency of provision). In the endowment treatment the returns from 
stage 1 became the stage 2 endowment, while in the MPCR treatment the MPCR in 
stage 2 increases on the basis of the level of stage 1 contributions to the group account. 
The impact of endowment carryover has mixed results. However carryover in MPCR 
increases contributions in both stages 1 and 2. The latter finding supports the 
behaviorally based hypothesis that carryover is ought to increase contributions. Even 
tough Cadigan et al. (2011) presented a valid carryover design they did not include 
generations of players, since subjects remained constant throughout stages.  
Offerman et al. (2001) tested in the laboratory the Pension Game studies by 
Hammond (1975), where the decision of a subject influences not only her payoff but 
also the payoff of her predecessor. The game is played by an infinite series of players 
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(P1, P2, P3, …) where the first player does not make any choice. Each succeeding player 
makes a choice between the set {A,B} with the following payoff scheme: 
Table 1.1 – Pension Game 
 
 Choice of Player Pt+1 
Choice of Player Pt A B 
A 50 15 
B 70 30 
 
If P2 chooses A, P1 receives 50, or if P2 chooses B, P1 receives 30. Each ensuing 
player Pt‘s payoff is determined by his own choice and by the choice of the next player 
Pt+1, his descendant. The conclusion of the game is determined by a 90-10 lottery. In 
the baseline treatment only 13.8% choices were cooperative, while with the 
introduction of a recommendation of grim trigger strategy by experimenters, 29,3% of 
individuals made cooperative choices. The relevance of Offerman et al. (2001) 
experiment is related to the mechanism embedded into overlapping generations: 
often there is no chance to revise your strategy when you leave a legacy to future 
generations. Also the experiment showed the importance of learning before the start 
of the game, in the form of direct communication between successive generations4.  
Schotter and Sopher (2001a,b and 2003) pioneered an inter-generational 
communication model, pointing out that when confronted with social dilemmas 
(specifically ultimatum and trust games) individuals tend to access to the wisdom of 
the past. The same approach has been extended to public goods games by Chauduri et 
al (2005): in their experiment subjects in one generation could leave advice for the 
next generation. When such advice is common knowledge rather than private (only 
for the immediate successor) or public (available to everybody but nor read aloud by 
                                                
4 Offerman et Al. (2001) make use of a Dictator Game (DG) to explore intergenerational altruism. Before 
them VanVan Der Heijden et al. (1998) used a similar approach. Later on also Güth et Al. (2002) 
researched intergenerational trasfers by means of a DG. Both studies have found that direct or indirect 
reciprocity does not seem to be a determinant that explains integenerational transfers. 
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the experimenter) it generates a process of social learning with higher contributions 
and less free riding. Since advice is generally exhortative, meaning that it suggests 
higher contributions and a cooperative strategy, the behavior is supported by general 
optimistic beliefs about others’ contributions. 
The most recent development in OLG PG experiments is imputable to Duffy and 
Lafky (2014). The mechanism design proposed in the paper consists of periodically 
replacing old members of a group with new members over time. Their findings show 
that, although first-period contributions to the public account are not influenced by 
the OLG matching protocol, average contributions experience considerably lower 
decay levels over time compared to standard VCM environment with fixed group 
membership. Consequently it could be that the traditional pattern of contribution and 
decay generally seen in PG games does not truthfully mirror the behavior of groups 
with changing membership, as it is observed in real life examples of PG production. In 
the same line of research in chapter 2 we propose a model that explains how 
equilibrium is reached in a context where heterogeneity is linked to seniority and 
strategic interaction is finitely repeated. The chapter studies cooperation and free-
riding behavior through a three-person linear public good game in which agents are 
asymmetric in productivity (heterogeneous MPCR), experience (seniority) and history.  
Williams (2013) on his working paper looked into yet another side of 
intergenerational PG. In his study he created a laboratory experiment to test if 
different methods of financing the public good can dynamically impact the welfare of 
subjects. The results showed two different results: the ability to borrow leads higher 
natural endowments for the next generation (through higher contributions and 
corresponding spillovers) but the next generation has a lower net endowment 
(endowment plus savings minus debt repayment) than the previous generation. This 
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difference happens because the debt reimbursement is higher than the gains from the 
previous generation’s investment in the public good.  
Another way of looking into intergenerational PG related dilemmas is by 
introducing the concept of intergenerational common pools resources (CPR), which 
are exploited by one generation after another. Fischer et al. (2004) run an experiment 
where the stock accessible to each generation changes following the extent of 
exploitation by prior cohorts and on resource’s growth rate (slow or fast). The goal of 
their experiment is to test the hypothesis that the overexploitation of CPR may be 
inferior than anticipated by previous experimental findings. The intuition behind this 
hypothesis lies in the fact that most of these experiments make use of models in 
which the consideration and fretfulness for future generations, and future generations 
themselves, are omitted. However intergenerational dynamics could provide 
significant incentives to restrain the exploitation of resources. Results of Fischer et al. 
(2004) experiment show that subjects’ behavior exhibits a form of altruistic restraint 
in the exploitation of the stock (intergenerational altruism), but not in an adequate 
amount to achieve the social optimum. The existence of an intergenerational 
connection induces subjects (in both slow and fast growth rate treatments) to 
anticipate fewer cases and lower levels of resource exploitation from each other 
compared to what individuals anticipate in a single generation control. However, on 
average, expectations are too optimistic and there is a clear discrepancy between 
expectations and appropriation behavior. Such inconsistency could imply that the 
sustainable use of CPR should not achievable on a purely voluntary basis, even if the 
principle of sustainable development is agreed upon. 
 
 19 
1.3.3 – Families and Genetic Transmission 
The most elementary unit of generational carry-over is de facto the family. 
Humans evolved over millennia into agents that invest heavily, both directly and 
indirectly, in their children, which are surprisingly dependent until a late age, if 
compared to other mammals. Furthermore adults support this heavy investment in 
children remaining net producers until old age, when they withdraw from labor and 
begin to consume more than they produce.  
Part of this investment consists of contributions towards family public goods 
(housework, care for sick family members, a trimmed garden) and part towards more 
general public goods (specifically long-run PG: education or health systems, major 
infrastructures and environmental protection). Families therefore voluntarily 
contribute to many public goods whose benefits spill over to members of other 
households. Private income transfers represent the remaining part of investment into 
children. The sum of these investments, plus personal parental consumption, are 
motivated by both care about children and other motivations such as self-interest.  
This dichotomous motivation has been pointed out since Adam Smith (1853), 
who in a famous passage argued that although people are selfish in their market 
transactions, altruism is very important within a family: 
Every man […] is first and principally recommended to his own care. 
[…] After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually 
live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers 
and sisters, are naturally the objects of his warmest affections. They are 
naturally and usually the persons upon whose happiness or misery his 
conduct must have the greatest influence. […] It approaches neared, in 
short, to what he feels for himself. 
  20 
 Becker (1974) took from Smith’s intuition to model his famous “Rotten Kid 
Theorem” which claims the following: if a family has a household head which is 
caring towards other family members and he is also sufficiently rich, then it is in the 
self-interest of other household members (i.e. the children) to make those strategic 
decisions that maximize the total family income, even at a cost to their own private 
income. In other words a selfish child has an incentive to invest in the optimal amount 
of the family public good, even when free-riding would maximize her own utility.  
To understand the interdependence of the relationship parent-child in terms of 
income and consumption we can use a simple example with one parent (P) and one 
child (K) (Peters et al., 2004). Consumption levels of P and K, denoted by CP and CK, are 
respectively: 
CP = YP  – t  and  CK = YK  + t  
where t is the generational transfer motivated by altruistic preferences, YP   is 
the exogenous income of the parent and YK is the exogenous income of the child. The 
preferences of the parent depend positively on the utility of the child, which in return 
depends positively on the transfer t. Also if YP is sufficiently larger that YK, the parent 
will allocate her own income between her own consumption and the redistribution to 
the child, influencing therefore the total consumption of her child. In addition t, and 
consequently CP are increasing in (YP + YK). The intuition is that the child would not 
make a decision that will reduce YP   more than it increases YK, since the reduction of YP   
will reflect into a reduction of t greater than the increase in YK. A child should 
therefore aim at maximizing the total family income.  
Peters et Al. (2004) tested exactly this theorem using experimental methods. By 
means of a standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) they compared groups 
with strangers and groups with members of real-life families, both with the same 
composition of two parents and two children. The results were consistent with 
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altruism since parents and children contributed more to the public good when in the 
real family setting, compared to groups composed of strangers. Further, parents 
contributed more compared to children and kept contributing even when they were in 
groups with children from other families. However the most striking result was that 
children’s behavior fell short of maximizing the total family income, in contrast with 
the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem.  
A possible explanation of these results can draw from the debate in 
evolutionary biology that parallels the economists’ Rotten Kid Theorem. Evolutionary 
biology brings two main concepts into the study of the economics of the family:  
1. Reproductive success is the measure of payoffs in games between family 
members; and  
2. The rules of Mendelian inheritance (with offspring tending to be like 
their parents) determine the passing of genes that program the strategy 
that an individual uses in games with its relatives. Individuals do not 
consciously choose strategies, but those are embedded into the genes 
that are transferred through natural selection. 
In what Bergstrom (1989) calls the “parent-offspring conflict” parents may 
disagree with children on how the resources of the family should be redistributed 
between its members, with children tending to desire that parents transfer more 
resources than the parent would, but with parents still being significantly altruistic. 
The biological model of kin selection by Hamilton (1964) could explain the final 
allocation of such resources.  “Hamilton’s rule” focuses on the gene rather than the 
individual: altruistic behavior among kin is governed by the implicit assumption and 
unconscious calculation of expected benefits and costs in terms of reproductive 
success. He predicted that a costly act that benefits a family member would be 
undertaken “if and only if the fitness cost incurred by the actor is outweighed by the 
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discounted fitness benefit bestowed on the relative, where the discount factor is 
Wright’s coefficient of relatedness” (Alger & Weibull, 2011). In other words parents are 
altruistic towards their children in order to increase the probability of survival of his 
own genes, while children are not fully aligned to the Rotten Kid Theorem (not 
showing symmetrical altruism to parents) because the flow of genes, and therefore 
resources, is essentially downwards. A child will tend to be essentially selfish until he 
himself becomes a parent. 
Another related stream of research focuses on the transmission of prosocial 
behavior values from parents to offspring, which indeed influence the propensity to 
free ride or cooperate in public goods games. Although this literature has not reached 
strong conclusions on whether parenting truly is the determinant of prosocial 
behavior, Harris (1995) argues that the true influence on behavior stems from 
childhood and adolescence peer groups. Cipriani et Al. (2007) tested this theory in the 
laboratory with an experiment in which a group of African American and Hispanic 
families played a standard public good game. 
The main results found by Cipriani et Al (2007) are striking: there is no 
significant correlation between the degree of cooperation of a child and that of her 
parents. However the difference between the children and parents’ average 
contribution is not statistically significant, consistently with previous findings by 
Harbaugh and Krause’s (2000)5. Still the contributions of children have a greater 
degree of variability compared to parents, presenting a higher proportion of “extreme 
contributions”. Furthermore girls contribute more than boys, younger children 
                                                
5 Using a public good game played by children aged between 6 and 12 years old, Harbough and Krause’s 
(2000) examined the development of altruistic and free-riding behavior. They find that the level of 
prosocial behavior in children and adults is similar, although repetition has different effects on the two 
age groups. While adults tend to decrease their contributions in time, young children tend to increase 
their contributions in later rounds. 
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contribute more than older ones and children from large families (more than 3 
children) contribute less than small households.  
1.3.4 – Local and Global Public Goods Experiments 
Introducing the topic of this chapter international PG were described. These 
goods can be excluded using space or distance as determinants. In this sense some 
types of goods are globally public, and others are only nationally or even locally public. 
Practically, the property rights to consumption of public goods are linked to their 
geographical extension: local public goods might be accessible only to the residents of 
a limited region while global public goods are available to the whole population of the 
world. Furthermore it is important to underline that local public goods have a 
tendency to grant higher marginal benefits only to the group’s members due to 
physical limitations, while global public goods give benefits more efficiently and 
broadly, but also more anonymously (Nitta, 2014). Moreover individuals, and 
institutions, could be able to choose among different levels of contribution between 
global, national or local public goods.  
The favorite choice of researchers, in order to capture in the laboratory this 
dichotomous social dilemma, is a linear VCM experiment, where subjects can 
contribute to both a local and a global public good. There are numerous 
experimental results available that consider multiple public goods under a VCM: the 
main feature of these experimental designs is that individuals are at the same time put 
into a local and a global environment and have to decide how to distribute their own 
endowment between the private good, the local public good and the global public 
good. Generally the global environment is designed in such a way that it contains the 
entire local groups. A common setting also includes higher marginal benefit for the 
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local public good compared to the global public good, which represents the socially 
optimal choice.  
The available literature since Hirshleifer’s (1983) shows a bias toward 
contributing to local needs. In his paper Hirshleifer discussed three different social 
composition functions that could represent different ways in which PG are produced: 
summation, weakest-link and best-shot. In the case of summation, which is the 
standard case, the PG available to the community (X) is simply made up by the sum of 
the individuals’ contribution (푿= 풊풙풊  , where i = 1 … n are the members of the 
community). In the second mechanism (weakest-link) the socially available quantity X 
corresponds to the minimum of the individual xi (X = 풎풊풏풊풙풊) , while for the last 
mechanism (best-shot) the socially available quantity X corresponds to the maximum 
of individual xi (X = 퐦퐚퐱풊풙풊). By introducing two alternatives PG social composition 
functions the author was able to explain why, for example, during times of catastrophe 
social behavior displays strong cases of cooperation and self-sacrifice. Relief and 
rescue operations are, during those times of hardship, fundamental public goods. 
Without those the community could not survive or strive in future, and cooperation is 
essential: even those who are normally selfish need to be cooperative if they wish for 
the community to simply outlast the threat. However these extreme cases of self-
sacrifice disappear when the risk of community collapse is back again to, or close to, 
pre-disaster levels. Also intervention and support to a community is much faster and 
effective when there is close spatial proximity to it. 
Blackwell et al. (2003) were the first to experimentally investigate how 
different levels of spatial excludability effect the production of PG. Their model 
included to different public goods: a local (excludable one) PG and a global (non-
excludable) PG. The following variables were defined: 
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xi: contribution of person i to the personal account, 
gi: contribution of person i to the local account, 
Gi: contribution of person i to the global account, 
αg: individual return to the local public good, 0 ≤ αg ≤ 1, 
αG: individual return to the global public good, 0 ≤ αG ≤ 1, and αG ≤ αg,  
n: number of individuals in the local group, 
N: number of total individuals, n < N. 
Under budget constraint the subject that seeks to maximize the individual 
payoff had to consider the following: 
Wi: initial allocation of tokens, where Wi: xi +gi +Gi, 
Ti: payoff to individual i, 
T: 풙풊 +휶품풋=  풏품풊 +휶푮풌=  푵푮풌 
The Nash equilibrium predicted for their game a dominant strategy of zero 
contribution towards both PG. The experiment tested three main hypotheses6 with 
four different treatments combining different MPCR and APCR (average per capita 
return, or the return to the whole society) for local and global public goods. The results 
showed that when the APCR for the local PG is smaller than that for the global PG 
individuals allot the majority of their PG contribution to the global PG. In addition 
contributions to the local PG are increasing in the previous contributions of the others 
in the local group and are negatively correlated to contributions to the global PG. More 
generally, contributions to the global PG decay over time but those to the local PG do 
not. Since contributions to the global PG decline over time it is plausible to state that 
the global PG effects dominates overall contributions. 
                                                
6 The three hypotheses tested in Blackwell and McKee (2003) were the following: individuals will 
contribute to PG, inidividuals will prefer contributing to the local Pg rather than the global PG, and lastly, 
individuals can be nudged to contribute to the global PG by increasing the social return to the global PG. 
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Fellner and Lunser (2008) extended previous investigations on the connection 
between MPCR to the contributions to local and global PG by holding constant the 
MPCR of the local PG and varying the MPCR of the global PG. The experimental results 
show that when the local and the global group have identical MPCR, individuals prefer 
to contribute towards the local PG, where, nevertheless, the familiar decline of 
contributions over rounds ensues. In contrast, Fellner and Lunser (2008) show that 
even if the global public good is more efficient and subjects’ first attempt is to 
cooperate in the global public good this tendency quickly solves and cooperation in 
the local public good increases. 
However, neither of the two studies addressed income heterogeneity. Nitta 
(2014) investigates how endowment heterogeneity between areas affects subjects’ 
provision decisions in the presence of both local and global PG. The paper finds that for 
the local public good, the high-income individuals contribute a higher percentage of 
their endowment to the local public good compared to low-income individuals. On the 
other hand for the global PG, high-income individuals contribute a greater percentage 
of their endowment to the global PG in the early stages, but their contributions decline 
faster compared to those of the low-income individuals. 
An interesting take into the provision of local and global public goods is the 
inclusion of a threshold setting: in a standard threshold PG game, if sufficient 
contributions are made to reach the indicated threshold level of contributions, the 
public good is produced, otherwise the funders lose their contributions and the good is 
not produced. The underlying intuition is that additional options make coordination 
more complex: Corazzini et al. (2013) is the first experimental paper to make this 
point in a setting with multiple public goods. The experiment includes four distinct 
treatments: the first is a benchmark with a single threshold public good, while the 
remaining three treatments, each with four public goods to which subjects may 
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contribute, study different combinations of efficiency between public goods. They 
show that when the number of potential recipients increases, total donations 
decrease. However nobody has yet shown the behavioral response to a threshold local 
and public goods game.  
Another important point that has not been considered yet regards spillover 
effects. An increased openness of Countries means a greater mobility of the public 
good, but also of the public bad, generating greater global systemic risks. Furthermore 
even if the benefit, or the detriment, is global, only some groups produce a global 
public good (or bad) because the others don’t have access to the opportunity to 
contribute or control it. Cross-border effects (which in experimental settings are 
represented by cross-group effects) produced by a group are often a mere externality, 
and as such they should be internalized (“internalizing externalities” principle). Also 
individuals not always fully understand and consider the benefits and costs during 
their decision-making process. This is also a central reason why public goods tend to 
be undersupplied, while public bads are likely to be oversupplied. 
 A public bad take on a global and local experimental setting could reveal 
interesting dynamics since individuals tend to make more cooperative choices in the 
public good game compared to the public bad game (Offerman, 1976). In Offerman’s 
(1997) public bad game individuals are asked to choose if and how much to withdraw 
from a common pool, that is if too many withdrawals are made no public good will be 
provided. One of the predictions made by Offerman (1997), in line with Pruitt (1967; 
1970; 1981) is that in the public good game individuals consider the interdependence 
between themselves and other participants as higher, compared to the public bad 
game. They also value mutual cooperation more in the public good game. Such 
prediction holds for both individualists and cooperators (Offerman, 1997: 122).  
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Another useful experimental design in order to investigate global and local 
public bad dynamics is similar to Andreoni (1995) “cold-prickle” negative framing. 
In his paper he points out that the, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, of investing in 
the private good is that one did not invest in the public good. As a consequence saying 
that contributing to the public good will benefit all members of the group is 
mathematically equivalent than saying that investing in the private good will make 
the other members of the group worse off. Practically, in the negative framing 
individuals have to allocate their endowment between two projects, A and B, while 
investing in project A gives a direct private return it also has a negative external effect: 
each token invested in project A has a negative return to all group members. This 
framing is obtained by substituting into the payoff function the budget constraint in 
place of the sum of the tokens given to the public good account. The results show that 
people are significantly more willing to contribute to the public good when the 
problem is posed as positive externality rather than as a negative externality, even if 
the incentives are the same. This shows that cooperation in public good games cannot 
be explained solely by pure altruism since the opportunities of free riding are the same 
independently of the frame (Andreoni, 1995). 
Finally another aspect of relevance for the production of local and global public 
goods is leadership. Moxnes and Van Der Heijden (2003) modeled the effect on the 
followers’ willingness to contribute toward the social optimum in a public bad setting, 
showing that there is a small but significant effect of a leader setting the good 
example. In the control treatment, with no leader, all participants made their 
investment decisions simultaneously, with the same type of behavior found in 
previous studies. On the other hand, in the leader treatment individuals were asked to 
decide simultaneously only after a leader made his choice, observable by all members 
of the group. On average, contributions to the public bad are lower in the presence of a 
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leader, and the level of the leader investment is important: followers’ contribution 
fluctuates from round to round following the variations in leader’s contributions.  
Leadership is relevant especially for global environmental and health problems that 
can be described as commons or public bad problems (climate change, ozone 
depletion, vaccination and finding a cure for a disease are all prominent examples). In 
such cases the individual (or local) marginal benefits of producing an extra unit of a 
public bad are thought to exceed the extra costs caused by relatively small own 
contributions to the total public bad. Conversely, global marginal costs possibly will be 
considerably higher than marginal benefits. This social dilemma makes global public 
bad problems hard to solve: solutions require coordination between individuals and 
groups, as well as supervision and enforcement. Leadership could possibly solve the 
issue, with international lead agencies being appointed and becoming every day more 
relevant in order to enhance the provision of global public goods or the control of 
global public bads. 
 
1.4 – Conclusion: Where to from here? 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that both generations and 
spatial membership play an important role in defining cooperative and selfish 
behavior in public good games. However current experimental literature has moved 
only small steps towards finding a conclusive theory regarding the direction and 
intensity of these effects. Clearly including generations and spatial membership in 
experimental settings is not a straightforward exercise since both require complex 
designs that are influenced by many variables. 
A potential option to push the envelope is to look into socio-biological theories 
of human cooperation based on kin selection and genetic transmission (Hamilton, 
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1964). In particular drawing from models of biological succession could help in 
designing an efficient mechanism to mimic generational carryover and the important 
dichotomy of altruistic parents and selfish children. 
For what concerns local and public goods the experimental literature is 
definitely well along but has yet to clarify what happens if thresholds are included in 
the production of the two PG (will subjects contribute more to the local PG or the 
global PG? What happens is the thresholds are different for local and global PG?). Also, 
there is little research done in terms of local and global public bads. 
Finally it is advisable that the theoretical insights gained in future 
developments of the international and transnational PG experimental literature are 
tested in field settings. This approach would further confirm the importance of 
considering “time and space” in institutional design aimed at the production of PG. 
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Chapter 2  –  Helping Out the Young and 
Inexperienced: an Experimental Approach to 
Generational Heterogeneity and Redistribution in 
Public Good Games. 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
The production of public goods often involves more than one generation of 
individuals, leaving the classic literature on voluntary provisions partially unfit to 
explain phenomena such as those related to welfare systems, climate policies, grants 
and aids for young entrepreneurs and major infrastructure projects. 
It appears therefore necessary to introduce adequate and plausible 
demographical and societal hypothesis into public good (PG) experiments in order to 
improve the understanding of voluntary contributions to long-lived public goods. In 
these experiments, groups – which may represent different levels of societal 
aggregation, such as organizations, institutions, lobbies or even unions – could be 
thought as entities with indefinite or infinite life, while individuals have finite and 
non-coterminous life spans (Dickson, 2001). In addition, it is reasonable to introduce 
the entry and exit of individuals at different stages of the game: birth, election, 
recruitment, enrollment as well as death, retirement, dismissal, and voluntary 
discharge are all events that determine the beginning and the end of individual 
provisions to public goods within groups. Furthermore, the level of seniority typifies 
individuals, in terms of experience, rights earned in time and cumulated benefits. Also, 
the benefit extracted from a public good is sometimes pre-determined by the 
legislator who sets the limits and modalities of utilization in relation to specific 
individual features. Summarizing, in order to fully understand the dynamics behind 
the production of intergenerational PG it is necessary to take into account groups with 
indefinite lives, individuals with definite lives and their type. 
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The model presented in this chapter focuses on the equilibrium that arises from 
repeated strategic generational interaction within groups, when individual 
heterogeneity is linked to seniority. More specifically the case of grant aids for fixed 
investments, as part of a broader industrial policy program, is fitted into the model in 
the form of a redistribution rule that benefits the younger players as a compensation 
for their inexperience. This is the case of policies that are aimed at supporting start-
ups or young companies in highly competitive environments or during recession (see 
section 2.1.1). 
This chapter makes two types of contributions: a methodological one and a 
policy one. The first one provides a relevant framework for the evaluation of the 
effects of seniority and imposed redistribution rules in voluntary provisions. It also 
raises the possibility of investigating generational interactions between heterogeneous 
players. The policy contribution highlights the importance of understanding the 
degree and type of heterogeneity between subjects before implementing a policy in 
order to generate the greatest extent of consensus possible. Consensus building is in 
fact a major challenge for policy makers since it can determine the success or failure of 
polices. Another reason for past policy failures could also be linked to underestimated 
effects of generational heterogeneity amongst stakeholders. This study makes a step 
forward in understanding the possible implications of demographical differences 
amongst the participants to a public good game. 
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2 .1.1 – Grants and Aids for Young Entrepreneurs and Start-Ups 
Listing some examples of complex PG phenomena we mentioned grants and aids 
for young entrepreneurs. Economic Prosperity is frequently cited as one of the greatest 
PG, and public policy has often turned to entrepreneurship to “maintain, restore or generate 
economic prosperity” (Acs et al., 2009). In addition an increase in economic wealth is 
often associated with an increase in spending in health, education, social protection 
etcetera.  
This chapter was originally conceived as research program in collaboration with the 
“Provincia Autonoma di Trento” (PAT – the autonomous province of Trento), more 
specifically the “Dipartimento Industria e Atigianato” (Department of Trade and Industry). 
PAT supports the development of local enterprises through the granting of incentives for 
investments in fixed assets, innovation and research, and through a series of systematic 
interventions governed by provincial law 6/1999 favoring young entrepreneurs, start-ups or 
companies facing serious challenges that undermine their solidity. In particular, this project 
intended to focus on those policies supporting fixed capital investments, understood as 
investments in properties, plants, machineries, equipment, patents, acquisitions of know-
how as well as costs related to environmental protection measures. In 2013/2014 the 
Department was considering an overhaul of the structure of such incentives; in particular it 
was evaluating the possibility of introducing more strict selection criteria and the 
“integrated package” (pacchetto integrato). The latter consists of a set of 3 tools (capital 
contributions, interest rate subsidies and financial guarantee) with the aim of transforming 
simple grants into conditional aids. Given the sensitivity of this transformation the 
Department formally shown its interest in the research of tools that facilitate the consensus 
over this transition. In this light the Department was involved in the design of the 
experiment. However during the development of the experiment it was clear that the 
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results were generally applicable to a wide range of PG issues, from redistribution of PG 
benefits to interaction dynamics between experienced and non-experienced players. 
 
2.1.2 – Public Good Games, Heterogeneity and Social Preferences 
This chapter lies at the intersection of the literatures on repeated public good 
games, the effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, overlapping generations (OLG) and 
evolution, adaptation and learning in voluntary contribution experiments.  
Public good games have been widely used in experimental economics in order 
to study the mechanisms behind free riding and cooperation. The literature on 
voluntary contribution mechanisms is extensive, especially in the context of 
homogenous groups (for a survey see Ledyard, 1995). Previous experimental research 
in this field has revealed that one-shot games contributions are relatively high (around 
40% to 60% of the initial endowment) while finitely repeated public good games are 
characterized by decay in contributions over time (Isaac et al., 1985).  
Recent progress that accounts for deviations from the expected free-riding zero 
contribution and decline over time has been made in two directions (Chaudhuri, 
2011). One has investigated the existence of different types of players, whom vary in 
their social preferences and/or beliefs about their peers. In this line of research the 
main outcome has been the formal and structured definition of conditional 
cooperators. The second set of studies has examined distributional concerns and 
intention-based models.  
Public good games with homogenous players have shown that individuals make 
positive, even if suboptimal, contributions to public good provision (Cherry et al. 2005; 
Gatchter and Herrmann 2009), but the effect of heterogeneity on cooperation has not 
been fully explained. First of all heterogeneity can refer to income, group or individual 
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productivity differences. Secondly, different types of heterogeneity can produce effects 
that work in opposite directions. 
Income heterogeneity has been introduced in public goods games by varying 
subjects’ initial endowment: the results in literature are mixed. Some studies found 
that cooperation is increased (Anderson et al. 2004, Cherry et al. 2005) while others 
claim that endowment asymmetry reduces cooperation (Chan et al. 1996, 1999; 
Buckley and Croson, 2006).  
Heterogeneity can also be introduced by varying subjective impact on either 
public or private accounts. Assigning to individuals different rates of return for their 
private accounts showed that the greater the return to the private good, the lower the 
cooperation rates (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997).  
Lastly, heterogeneity in productivity is introduced using the proxy of marginal 
per capita return (MPCR). MPCR is a key parameter in public good games and 
represents the benefit that each participant receives from each money unit 
contributed to the group account by any group member. Hence, high MPCR players 
show higher propensity to contribute to public good provision if compared to low 
MPCR players (Fisher et al., 1995). The explanation given is that high MPCR types 
contribute more, either because they can take greater advantage from the joint project 
or because their costs of contribution is lower.  
Another explanation could take into account social preferences. Andreoni’s 
(1995) research on public goods suggests that the motivations related to social 
preferences might depend on whether the provision of the public good is framed 
positively or negatively. This finding was elicited with the standard linear public good 
game under two experimental conditions: one with a positive framing, so that 
subjects would be motivated by warm-glow altruism and the other with a negative 
framing, so that subjects would be motivated by a desire to avoid a “cold prickle” of 
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guilt. The result is that subjects in the positive frame treatment are much more 
cooperative than subjects in the negative frame treatment, since the tendency to free 
ride is higher in the negative framing. However experimental studies that investigate 
the framing valence of different MPCR are not yet available. The current literature 
introduces at maximum two different MCPR, one high and one low, while no study has 
considered at least three MCPR within groups. Different MPCR, as said before, 
represent different levels of within group productivity. Such differences could be 
linked to subject-specific characteristics, or be imposed as a redistribution rule by an 
external third party.  
Regarding transfers over time in public games, these have been modeled as 
repeated two-stage games with carryover that can either benefit the same or another 
group (Cadigan et al, 2011 and Grolleau et al., 2013). In this paper imperfect-
overlapping generations (OLG when the exit of players happens after they benefitted 
from their contribution to a public good) has been represented by different MPCR 
assigned to different generations of subjects. Repeated public good games with OLG 
have mainly looked into public imperfect monitoring over the intergenerational 
cooperative dimension with long-lived public goods, especially in the field of climate 
policy (Karp, 2013).  
The model proposed in this chapter has been developed keeping in mind the 
peculiarities of grant aids for fixed investments. Since grants are considered the offset 
of taxes – i.e., they are based on redistribution, while taxes follow contribution rules – 
heterogeneity in MPCR has been used as a policy proxy. From this perspective, the 
relevant behavioral economics literature covers the issues of fairness and social 
preferences.  
Social preferences are defined as the care of people not only for their own well-
being, but also for the payoffs and/or actions of others. Such prefe
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altruism, fairness, reciprocity, and inequity aversion. Amongst the numerous social 
preferences theories, those developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002) have received the most attention, 
especially from scholars attempting to evaluate the predictions of these models using 
laboratory experiments. Laboratory tests comparing social preferences theories have 
generated mixed results especially on iniquity aversion, which is the dislike of people 
for inequitable outcomes – i.e., in order to achieve more equitable outcomes subjects 
are willing to give up some monetary payoff (Kritikos and Bolle, 2001; Riedl and 
Vyrastekova, 2003; Güth et al., 2003; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Bereby-Meyer and 
Niederle, 2005; Chmura et al., 2005). 
In order to frame redistribution rules, it is crucial to consider some specific 
biases and heuristics related to iniquity aversion. The informative representation of 
the redistributive norm could exploit the compromise and contrast effects (Sunstein, 
2000) and the framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). This approach should 
also consider the repercussions of the status quo (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984) and 
anchoring and adjustment biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981, 2000). For example, 
when entrepreneurs see their grant aids diminishing from one year to the next, they 
tend to be less supportive towards the industrial policy program, even if the same 
program has endowed them with additional benefits, such as lower taxes.  
However just introducing altruism cannot explain why subjects do not 
contribute their entire endowment when this is the socially optimum equilibrium. 
This leads to the introduction of dynamic models of evolution and adjustment. A 
particularly simple model in literature introduces the idea of replicator dynamic, 
where the probability of a specific contribution level is assumed to change depending 
on the earnings relative to the average of the population (Miller and Andreoni, 1991). 
  38 
In other words contributions with an expected payoff above the population average 
should increase in frequency, while contributions below this average should decrease. 
Additional empirical evidence demonstrated that contributions tend to be 
lower in late rounds of a session than in early rounds, and experienced participants 
contribute less than inexperienced ones (Holt and Laury, 2008). Learning is often 
pointed as the explanation for such behavior: individuals might either learn to use a 
dominant strategy or what to expect from others, which possibly will affect their 
attitude toward others’ payoffs. 
Given the above background, the experiment presented in this chapter tests in 
the laboratory two main hypotheses: 
HP 1: Complete information of heterogeneity in individual productivity 
(represented by different marginal per capita return within groups) increases 
voluntary contributions toward a public good. 
HP 2: The introduction of imperfect OLG, and therefore the creation of 
experienced players, improves the levels of cooperation in public good games. 
These hypotheses will be tested and measured by means of three different 
public good games, as illustrated in the next section.  
 
2.2 – Method and Model 
We model grants with imperfect OLG as a variation of a public good game 
where there are two goods – one private and one public – and N individuals. Each 
individual i = 1, .., N is endowed with an amount of the private good, zi. The private 
good contributed (t) by the i-th individual is used to produce the public good following 
a production function Y =f(Σti) where ti is the amount of private good contributed by 
each individual in order to produce Y. The production function f(Σti) represents the 
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benefits from cooperation before being equally divided among all N group members. 
The outcome of a public good experiment consists of two items: a level of public good 
Y and a reallocation of the private good for each agent x1, ..., xN. Player’s i’s individual 
payoff, πi, equals: πi = zi - ti + (a+bδi) Σti, where (a+bδi) is the decomposition of the MPCR 
with δi being an individual productivity factor. If 1/N < (a+bδi) < 1 the game is a social 
dilemma since individually, each player is best off giving nothing to the public good, 
but collectively the players are best off donating their entire endowments.  
 
2.2.1 – Experimental Design 
The experiment consisted of four treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Horizontal Baseline Treatment (HBT), Treatment 1 (T1) and Treatment 2 (T2). Table 2.1 
summarizes the main features of the four treatments. 
Table 2.1 – Treatments Structure. 
 
Treatment Over # days 
Heterogeneity 
(MPCR) 
Entry/Exit 
of Subjects 
Number 
of 
Sessions 
Number of 
Subjects 
Involved 
BT 1 3 MPCR (0.40 0.65 0.90) No 4 66 
HBT 3 1 MPCR (0.40) Yes 1 30 
T1 3 3 MPCR (0.40 0.65 0.90) 
Constant 
Yes 2 55 
T2 3 3 MPCR (0.40 0.65 0.90) 
Decreasing 
Yes 2 55 
 
The baseline treatment (BT) involved 66 individuals, which were randomly and 
equally assigned to three different categories of players (named type A, type B and 
type C), each with a different δi.  In particular δType A < δType B < δType C, with δType A = 0, δType B = 
0.5, δType C = 1.0, and MPCRType A = 0.40,  MPCRType B = 0.65,  MPCRType  = 0.90.  Individuals then 
formed constant groups of three members each, one from each category, and played 
20 consecutive rounds of a standard public good game.  
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A second baseline treatment was run in order to check for the effect of new 
subjects entering the PG game. We called it “Horizontal Baseline Treatment” (HBT) and 
it ran over three consecutive days (D0, D1 and D2), involving a total of 30 subjects 
playing each day 20 rounds of a public good game. In D0 18 subjects belonged to type 
A players, with δType A = 0 and MPCRType A = 0.40, formed constant groups of three 
members each and played 20 consecutive rounds of a standard public good game. At 
the end of D0 12 individuals were randomly drawn to participate to the experiment in 
D17. In D1 6 new individuals were introduced with the same parameters of type A 
players, but they were labeled as type B. New constant groups of 3 subjects were 
formed by randomly choosing 2 type A and 1 type B individuals. At the end of D1 6 
individuals were randomly drawn from the 12 type A players to participate to the 
experiment in D2, while all type B players moved on to D2. In D2 6 new individuals 
were introduced with the same parameters of type A and type B players, and they 
were labeled type C. New constant groups of 3 subjects were formed by randomly 
choosing 1 type A, 1 type B and 1 type C individuals. 
The first treatment (T1) ran over three consecutive days (D0, D1 and D2), 
involving a total of 55 subjects playing 20 rounds of a public good game. In D0  33 
subjects belonged to type A players, with δType A = 0 and MPCRType A = 0.40, formed 
constant groups of three members each and played 20 consecutive rounds of a 
standard public good game. At the end of D0 22 individuals were randomly drawn to 
participate to the experiment in D1. In D1 11 new individuals were introduced with 
the parameters of type B players: δType B = 0.5 and MPCRType B = 0.65. New constant groups 
of 3 subjects were formed by randomly choosing 2 type A and 1 type B individuals. At 
the end of D1 11 individuals were randomly drawn from the 22 type A players to 
                                                
7 At the end of each day, subjects that were not randomly drawn to continue participating in the 
experiment in the next day were paid and left. They were not eligible for any other treatment of the same 
experiment. 
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participate to the experiment in D2, while all type B players moved to D2. In D2 11 
new individuals were introduced with the parameters of type C players: δType c = 1.0 and 
MPCRType C = 0.90. New constant groups of 3 subjects were formed by randomly 
choosing 1 type A, 1 type B and 1 type C  individuals. 
The second treatment (T2) ran as well on three consecutive days (D0, D1 and 
D2), involving 55 subjects playing each day 20 rounds of a public good game. In D0 all 
18 subjects belonged to type A’ players, with δType A’ = 1.0 and MPCRType A’ = 0.90, formed 
constant groups of three members each and played 20 consecutive rounds of a 
standard public good game. At the end of D0 12 individuals were randomly drawn to 
participate to the experiment in D1. In D1 6 new individuals were introduced with the 
parameters of type B’ players: δType B ‘= 1.0 and MPCRType B = 0.90, while type A’ players 
saw their parameters being reduced with δType A’ = 0.5 and MPCRType A’ = 0.65. New 
constant groups of 3 subjects were formed by randomly choosing 2 type A’ and 1 type 
B’ individuals. At the end of D1 6 individuals were randomly drawn from the 12 type 
A’ players to participate to the experiment in D2, while all type B’ players moved to 
D2. In D2 6 new individuals were introduced with the parameters of type C’ players: 
δType c’ = 1.0 and MPCRType C’ = 0.90, while type A’ players saw their parameters being 
reduced with δType A’ = 0 and MPCRType A’ = 0.40 and type B’ with δType B’ = 0.5 and MPCRType A’ = 
0.65. New constant groups of 3 subjects were formed by randomly choosing 1 type A’, 
1 type B’ and 1 type C’ individuals. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the group composition over the 3 days of the 
experiment for treatments HBT, T1 and T2. 
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Figure 2.1 – Day and group composition for a standard session 
 
 
The computerized experiment took place at the CEEL (Cognitive and 
Experimental Economics Laboratory) at the University of Trento in June, September, 
October and November 2013 and May 2014. As they entered the laboratory, subjects 
were randomly seated at computer stations separated by partitions. At the beginning 
of each session the instructions were read aloud and subjects were invited to answer 
four multiple-choice control questions to test their comprehension of the 
experimental task. The answers were checked and if wrong, corrected. Afterwards, 
participants were encouraged to pose clarifying questions in private. Once all doubts 
were clarified the experiment began.  
In all treatments players interacted anonymously, but their types and relative 
parameters was common knowledge. Each individual received 30 experimental 
currency units (ECU) at the beginning of each round and simultaneously had to decide 
how much to put into their private account and how much to contribute towards the 
common pool. At the end of each round they were informed about the individual 
contribution, the total contribution to the common pool and their own payoff. At the 
end of the 20 rounds – except for players in HBT, T1 and T2 that were randomly 
chosen to continue the experiment the next day – individuals were paid, using a 
random lottery incentive mechanism, 0.20 euro for each ECU earned plus a daily show 
up fee of 3.00 euro. Subjects earned, including the show up fee, on average 14.49 euro 
(SD=6.27 euro) for BT, 16.12 euro (SD=9.42) for HBT, 17.41 euro (SD=7.17 euro) for T1 
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and 28.20 euro (SD=14.70 euro) for T2. Individuals were enrolled by voluntary 
subscription among students of the University of Trento. 
 
2.2.2 – Behavioral Predictions 
Formally, standard game theory predicts that, if the game is played only 
once, the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium is zero contribution. When the public 
good game is finitely repeated and backward induction arguments are applied, zero 
contributions are expected in all rounds. However, laboratory experiments show that 
subjects tend to contribute more than predicted. In addition contributions tend to 
increase in MPCR and in the number of players, even if changes in these parameters do 
not affect the Nash equilibrium. More specifically as the marginal valuation of the 
private good gets closer to the marginal valuation of the public good more and greater 
violations of the dominant strategy are observed. Full free riding is generally not 
observed, even after as many as 60 rounds. Nevertheless violations of the dominant 
strategy diminish both with repetition and with experience (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 
1997). 
Summarizing, specific behavioral predictions for the treatments are: 
BT:     – t Type A < t Type B < t Type C  
T1 and T2:  In D1   – t Type A < t Type B  
– t Type A in D1 < t Type A in D0 
  In D2  – t Type A < t Type B < t Type C 
– t Type A in D2 < t Type A in D1 < t Type A in D0 
– t Type B in D2 < t Type B in D1 
 
where t is the private good contributed. 
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2.3 – Results 
In this session the results are illustrated, which are based on 206 subjects who 
attended and played 9 experimental sessions, 5 of which over 3 days. Firstly, partial 
consistency with the results of previous experiments is shown. However the main 
results focus on the impact of generational heterogeneity, both in terms of individual 
productivity and contribution decisions, showing new decision dynamics in PG games. 
The core analysis includes both non-parametric statistics and regression methods.  
 
2.3.1 – Comparison to Previous Experiments 
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of average group contributions over time in the 
four treatments. The results of the BT show analogous patterns to the stylized facts of 
repeated PG games: contributions start high and decay over the period of repetition. 
This hints that cooperation strategies have decreasing gains as the game nears its end. 
Still, neither BT nor HBT or T1 or T2 decline to complete free riding.  
 
Figure 2.2 – BT, HBT-D2, T1-D2 and T2-D2 average group contribution. 
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Table 2.2 depicts the average percent individually contributed to the public good, 
combining all 20 rounds and discerning between treatments BT, HBT, T1 and T2. For 
the treatments that developed over three days we considered only the last day (D2), so 
that comparison for the same group composition was possible.  
 
Table 2.2 – Average percent individual contribution to the public good. 
 
 α HBT – D2 α BT T1 – D2 T2 – D2 
Overall - 28.6% - 53.5% 52.9% 39.5% 
Type A 0.40 24.3% 0.40 45.1% 42.5% 27.6% 
Type B 0.40 32.9% 0.65 47.5% 50.7% 48.0% 
Type C 0.40 28.6% 0.90 68.0% 65.4% 43.0% 
 
In BT the average contribution across all rounds [53.5%] is significantly higher 
compared to other standard public good games such as Andreoni (1988, 1995) [33.2%] 
and Croson (1996) [35.7%]. However HBT-D2 shows closer average contributions to 
the standard classic literature [28.6%], fostering our hypothesis that it is heterogeneity 
in MPCR that has an impact in PG contributions, not only experience. Furthermore BT 
shows lower rates of non-cooperative end-game behavior compared to standard 
public good games. Last rounds average contributions range from 43.0% in the fifth-
last round to 38% in the last one. These are higher compared to 11.6% in Andreoni and 
10.6% in Croson. This is consistent with previous literature, which has already shown 
that if individuals are aware of heterogeneity, contributions will increase in general 
(Fellner et al., 2011).   
Another result in line with previous studies (Fellner et al. 2011)is that when 
contributions can be linked to the type of the player individuals with greater MPCR 
(Type C) contribute more compared to individuals with lower MPCR (Type A and B). 
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This result holds for BT and T1, however in T2 average contributions are generally in 
line with standard public good games. In particular Type A players seem to have a 
significantly lower average contribution compared to both the literature and their 
counterparts in this experiment. 
 
2.3.2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Looking again at table 2.1 we can observe a striking difference between the four 
tratments. Consequently the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is calculated. The difference 
between the average group contributions in BT and T1 is significant (Wilcoxon signed 
rank Test, p=0.002325). Also the difference between average group contributions in BT 
and T2, as well in T1 and T2 are significant (Wilcoxon Test p-value <0.0001). However 
analyzing exclusively the average individual contribution in D2 shows that the 
difference between BT and T1 is not significant (Wilcoxon Test p-value 0.932), while 
between BT and T2 and T1 and T2 the differences are significant (Wilcoxon Test p-
value 0,02159 and 0.03483 respectively).  
 
RESULT 1 - Individuals with a high MPCR will contribute a larger percentage of 
their per-period income to the public good, except in T2.  
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that in BT and T1 the introduction of a middling MPCR 
(Type B) yields results that are aligned to standard behavioral predictions. In particular 
it is expected that the average contribution follows the relation t Type A < t Type B < t Type C . 
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Table 2.3 – BT average contribution to the public good and relative standard 
deviations, for type of player.  
 
 α µ σ 
Type A 0.40 13.53 3.67 
Type B 0.65 14.24 3.00 
Type C 0.90 20.39 2.51 
 
 
Table 2.4 – T1 daily average contribution to the public good and relative standard 
deviations. 
 
  D0 D1 D2 
 α µ σ µ σ µ σ 
Type A 0.40 11.25 3.68 13.93 4.24 12.76 3.52 
Type B 0.65 - - 14.56 4.00 15.20 1.98 
Type C 0.90 - - - - 19.63 1.67 
 
On the other hand in T2 it can observed that the introduction of a middling MPCR 
(Type B) yields puzzling results: in D2 the average contribution follows the relation t 
Type A < t Type C < t Type B (Table 2.5). In other words the middling type contributes the most to 
the public good. This effect is most probably due to the MPCR design in T2. 
 
Table 2.5 – T2 daily average contribution to the public good and relative overall round 
average standard deviations 
  D0  D1  D2 
 α µ σ α µ σ α µ σ 
Type A 0.90 18.08 1.85 0.65 16.45 1.13 0.40 8.26 3.37 
Type B - - - 0.90 19.44 2.02 0.65 14.38 3.10 
Type C - - - - - - 0.90 12.89 3.04 
 
 
RESULT 2 – Upward social comparison negatively affects contributions. 
 Comparing between the self and the others is a fundamental psychological 
mechanism influencing individual’s beliefs and behaviors. When individuals want to 
know how they should or shouldn’t behave they naturally compare their 
characteristics, wealth and/or weaknesses to those of others. Social comparison is 
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essentially of two kinds: downwards or upwards. Downward comparisons are done by 
people that seek lower standards to boost their self-view with a favorable comparison 
(Wills, 1981). Individuals with a threatened self-view will be particularly prone to 
downward comparison since it has the capability to protect or enhance one's self-view 
(Wills, 1981). On the other hand the need to self-improve is most likely satisfied by 
comparisons with upward standards, which could serve as models. However upward 
comparison is effective if, and only if the self is perceived as mutable. If the self in 
perceived as set and unchangeable individuals could react defensively, undermining or 
disputing the relevance of the standard (Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000). 
Since subjects playing public good games want to maximize their payoff function, 
improving their outcome after each round, they naturally tend to apply upward 
comparisons. Unfortunately part of their self, specifically their assigned MPCR, is not 
adjustable. Therefore they might react defensively by reducing, rather than increasing, 
their voluntary provision. 
The intuition of the negative effect of upward social comparison is confirmed by 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test: differences across types of players in BT show that 
choices of Type A and Type B statistically differ from Type C at the 5% confidence level 
(p-values respectively of 0.005 and 0.009). No statistically significant differences are 
registered for the other remaining comparison (Type A from Type B, p-value 0.5109). 
Thus, relative disadvantage seems to affect contribution choices more than relative 
advantage (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3 – Box plot of average contribution for each type of player in BT. 
 
 
The same test has been repeated for the treatment T1 and T2. In T1 the result is 
only partially consistent with what has been found in BT (Figure 2.4): Wilcoxon signed 
rank test shows that only choices of Type A statistically differ from Type C at the 5% 
confidence level (p-values of 0.03998). No statistically significant differences are 
registered for the other remaining comparison (Type A from Type B, p-value 0.3316 
and Type B from Type C, p-value 0.1713).   
 
Figure 2.4 – Box plot of average contribution for each type of player in T1. 
 
On the other hand in T2 results are consistent with what has been found in BT 
(Figure 2.5): differences across types of players in T2 show that choices of Type A and 
Type B statistically differ from Type C at the 5% confidence level (p-values respectively 
of 0.0002 and 0.0234). There are no statistically significant differences between Type A 
and Type B (p-value 0.0688).  
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Figure 2.5 – Box plot of average contribution for each type of player in T2. 
 
RESULT 3 – Heterogeneity increases the difficulty of settling on a strategy for 
Type A and Type B players.   
In standard public good games, with homogeneous players, individuals favor a 
contribution strategy of equal provisions and are willing to apply costly punishments 
to group members that depart from this strategy (Fehr and Gachter 2000, 2002; Fehr 
and Fischbacher 2004; Gachter et al. 2008; Gachter and Herrmann 2009). However 
when heterogeneity is introduced equal contributions yield unequal payoffs and a 
contribution norm is harder to achieve, especially for those who are penalized by 
heterogeneity itself. In particular the standard deviation follows the following relation 
δType A > δType B> δType C in treatments BT and T1 (Tables 2.3 – 2.4). Interestingly in T2-D2 for 
all players there is a similar standard deviation: possibly both heterogeneity in MPCR 
and the variation of MPCR between days for the same type of players generates greater 
difficulty in settling on a strategy.  
 
RESULT 4 – When heterogeneity is linked to seniority, favoring least experience 
players, cooperation is negatively affected.   
Individuals penalized by heterogeneity also show different degrees of 
cooperation and free-riding if heterogeneity is assigned randomly as in BT or can be 
directly link to the history of playing as in T1.  A first glimpse of this effect can be seen 
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in Table 2.6 , where the percentage of times all ECU are contributed is 22.3% for the BT, 
while only 16.4% for T1-D2 and6.5% for T2-D2. 
 
Table 2.6 – Average Contribution, Zero ECU, All ECU (aggregated over all rounds) 
 
 Average percent contributed 
Percent of times 
zero ECU 
contributed 
Percent of times 
all  ECU 
contributed 
BT 53.5 15.6 22.3 
T1 – D0 37.5 33.6 11.7 
T1 – D1 47.4 26.2 19.1 
T1 – D2 52.9 10.8 16.4 
T2 – D0 60.3 6.21 28.48 
T2 – D1 58.2 14.6 20.8 
T2 – D2 39.5 26.1 6.5 
 
If the same results are broken down by type of individual it is clear that Type A is 
the most affected by seniority, with a significantly lower percentage of all ECU 
contributed in T1 compared to BT (13.6% and 24.3% respectively). 
 
Table 2.7 – Percentage zero ECU contributed, percentage all ECU contributed (specified 
for type of player).  
 
 Type α 
Percent of times 
zero ECU 
contributed 
Percent of times 
all ECU 
contributed 
BT A 0.40 14.8 24.3 
 B 0.65 17.3 18.2 
 C 0.90 7.5 40.2 
T1 – D0 A 0.40 33.6 11.7 
T1 – D1 A 0.40 30.5 20.2 
 B 0.65 17.7 16.8 
T1 – D2 A 0.40 20.9 13.6 
 B 0.65 8.2 14.5 
 C 0.90 3.2 20.9 
T2 – D0 A 0.90 6.2 28.5 
T2 – D1 A 0.65 14.8 18.4 
 B 0.90 14.1 25.5 
T2 – D2 A 0.40 36.8 2.7 
 B 0.65 22.7 6.8 
 C 0.90 18.6 10.0 
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Also it is interesting to compare T1-D2 and T2-D2: as shown in Table 2.8, T2 
presents greater levels of “zero ECU contributed” as well as much lower levels for “all 
ECU contributed”.  
 
Table 2.8 – Percentage zero ECU contributed, percentage all ECU contributed (specified 
for type of player for T1-D2 and T2-D2).  
 
Type α Percent of times zero ECU contributed Percent of times all ECU contributed 
  T1 T2 T1 T2 
A 0.40 20.9 36.8 13.6 2.7 
B 0.65 8.2 22.7 14.5 6.8 
C 0.90 3.2 18.6 20.9 10.0 
 
 
RESULT 5 – Becoming disadvantaged affects public good provision more than 
just being at a disadvantage. 
 In T1, Type A individuals maintained their MPCR constant and equal to 0.4 in 
all 3 days of the experiment. In D1 and D2 subjects had to play with new entrants 
whose MPCR was higher than theirs. In T2 Type A individuals saw their MPCR being 
reduced from 0.9 in D0 to 0.65 in D1, and from 0.65 in D1 to 0.4 in D2.  In other words 
subjects Type A in T2 had to play with new entrants whose MPCR was equal to theirs 
in the previous day (Table 2.9). 
 
Table 2.9 – Evolution of MPCR for Type 1 individuals in T1 and T2 
(comparison to their counterpart) 
 
Treatment Player Type D0 D1 D2 
A 0.40 0.40 0.40 
B - 0.65 0.65 1 
C - - 0.90 
A 0.90 0.65 0.40 
B - 0.90 0.65 2 
C  - 0.90 
 
Heterogeneity in MPCR has been always considered to have a strong effect on 
the voluntary contributions towards public goods, while experience, repetition and 
learning have generally mixed effects (Ledyard, 1995). In this experiment experience 
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does not seem to have an effect on average contributions, for any type of player (Table 
2.10, column p-value (µiBT, µiT1-D2)). On the other hand history generates effects 
worth of note (Table 2.10, column p-value (µiBT,  µiT2-D2)). In particular for Type A 
players (Wilcoxon Test p-value 0.06674) and Type C (Wilcoxon Test p-value 0,0153).  
With the term “history” we intend the way in which players were led to an 
experimental setting of three members per group with three different MPCR of 0.40, 
0.65 and 0.9 each. In the BT a random process defined the setting. In T1 the process 
was initially random but subsequently it was only partially unsystematic: players who 
started in D0 were assigned a constant MPCR of 0.40, while players who started in D1 
were assigned a constant MPCR of 0.65 and both participated to the experiment in 
subsequent days by random draw. In T2 the process was initially random but 
subsequently a clear reduction of the MPCR was made upon those subjects with 
experience: players who started in D0 were assigned a MPCR of 0.90, participated to 
the experiment in D1 and D2 by random draw and saw their MPCR being reduced to 
0.65 and then 0.40 in favor of new players (Table 4). 
 
Table 2.10 – Comparison of average contributions for types of players in BT, T1 and T2 
(Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test) 
 
Type α µBT µT1-D2 µT2-D2 
p-value 
(µiBT,  µiT1-D2) 
p-value 
(µiBT, µiT2-D2) 
p-value 
(µiT1-D2, µiT2-D2) 
A 0.40 13.53 12.76 8.26 0.9695 0.06674 0.133 
B 0.65 14.24 15.20 14.39 0.5538 0.7745 0.89 
C 0.90 20.40 19.63 12.90 0.6605 0.0153 0.0336 
 
2.3.2 – Regression Analysis 
Table 2.11 reports the results of a random effects GLS regression of the 
individual contributions. The dependent variable Contributions is regressed on the 
explanatory treatment variables, namely T1, T2, alpha 0.65 and alpha 0.90. The 
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interactions between are also included in the model: T1 with alpha 0.65, T2 with alpha 
0.65, T1 with alpha 0.90 and T2 with 0.90 (the interactions are denoted by the X term).  
 
Table 2.11 – Random Effects GLS Regression (individual contributions) 
 
Contribution Coeff. (Std. Err) 
T1 -0.768 (2.810) 
T2 -5.264 (2.810)** 
alpha 0.65 0.714 (2.294) 
alpha 0.90** 6.870 (2.294)** 
T1 X alpha 0.65 1.736 (3.974) 
T2 X alpha 0.65 5.409 (3.974) 
T1 X alpha 0.90 0.002 (3.974)  
T2 X alpha 0.90 -2.238 (3.974) 
0bs 2640 
Groups 132 
Wald Chi-Square test (p-value) 0.0008 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Table 2.13 reports the results of a cluster estimator of the individual 
contributions on the same explanatory variables listed before. This allowed for 
intragroup correlation, specifying that the data has repeated observations on 
individuals. 
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Table 2.12 – Linear Regression Cluster Id (individual contributions) 
 
Contribution Coeff. (Std. Err) 
T1 -0.768 (2.793) 
T2** -5.263 (2.546) 
alpha 0.65 0.714 (2.426) 
alpha 0.90** 6.870 (2.312) 
T1 X alpha 0.65 1.736 (3.839) 
T2 X alpha 0.65 5.409 (3.861) 
T1 X alpha 0.90 0.002 (3.757)  
T2 X alpha 0.90 -2.238 (3.716) 
0bs 2640 
Log Likelihood (p-value) 0.0001 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Both regressions confirm the previous insights about the importance of history 
(how we reached a specific MPCR set up): treatment2 has a negative impact on 
individual contributions. On the other hand, and consistent with the literature, the 
highest MPCR (alpha3) has a positive and significant impact on mean individual 
contributions.  
In addition we also checked for gender (dummies 1 for female and 0 for male) 
but with no statistically significant effect (p-value 0.909). 
 
2.4 – Discussion  
This paper studies cooperation and free-riding behavior through a three-person 
linear public good game in which agents are asymmetric in productivity 
(heterogeneous MPCR), experience (seniority) and history. The data analysis uncovers 
the following conclusions.  
First, when more than two MPCR are used as a proxy of complex heterogeneity 
within groups, strategic interactions are in line with previous robust results on 
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“simple” heterogeneity (two MPCR  - one “high” and one “low”). However the strength 
of this effect is not linear. This suggests that policy makers who intend to control 
voluntary provisions cannot disregard the degree and extent of heterogeneity. In 
particular when heterogeneity is imposed from top to bottom, upward social 
comparison is negatively affecting middling-types. These tend to focus more on their 
relative disadvantage compared to high-types, than focusing on their advantageous 
condition compared to low-types.  
Secondly, heterogeneity generates distress in reaching a settlement between 
parties. Specifically, middling and low types of players struggle more to decide the 
strategy behind their contribution level.  
On the other hand seniority overall reduces this effect: the presence of experienced 
players in a group is reflected in lower levels of variance in average contributions.  This 
is in line with the conclusions of Tan (2008), who showed that the behavior of 
productive and experienced individuals generates greater side effects than their less 
productive counterparts. This mirrors reality where privileged are under higher 
pressure, since their choices profoundly impact society.  
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Chapter 3  - Grandparents Matter: Perspectives on 
Intergenerational Altruism - An Experiment on 
Family Dynamic Spillovers in Public Goods Games.  
 
3.1 – Introduction 
Public goods are both characterized and defined by a very simple, yet difficult 
to fully unravel and explain, social dilemma: individuals are conflicted between 
maximizing personal gain and cooperate for the collective interest. They are called to 
choose if and how much to invest between a private good and a common project that, 
although more fruitful, benefits both contributors and non-contributors. At the end of 
the choice spectrum two options are available: the Nash Equilibrium of free riding and 
the social optimum of full cooperation. In between rests a continuum of possibilities.  
Also, as illustrated in Chapter 1, issues around public goods are further 
complicated when time and space are included into the picture. Focusing on the time 
dimension for the purpose of this chapter, it is clear that each generation inherits from 
the previous one many things, including public goods and their externalities (think, for 
example, of infrastructures, health care or education systems, etcetera). This also 
means that generations invest into public goods that will benefit future generations, 
which indicates the existence of a kind of intergenerational altruism and cooperation.  
The results of the experiment carried out by Fischer et al. (2004) suggest that 
intergenerational responsibility is actually recognized, leading individuals to consider 
the additional externalities of their actions and consequently moving closer to the 
social optimum.  
Intergenerational altruism and cooperation, and per contra account 
intergenerational free-riding, could be also viewed from a biological point of view, 
since future generations are the offspring of current ones. Tension between individual 
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and group success is universal at all levels of biological organization, from bacteria to 
institutions. However altruistic behavior is more common in species with complex 
social structures8. Making matters slightly more complex is the exact notion of 
altruism in evolutionary biology: an organism is said to behave altruistically when its 
behavior benefits other organisms, costing him. Reproductive fitness measures costs 
and benefits (estimated number of progeny). Thus by behaving altruistically, an 
organism decreases the number of progeny it is expected to generate for itself, but 
increases the estimated number of progeny for other organisms. The presence of 
altruism in nature is therefore puzzling from a strictly Darwinian point of view. 
However natural selection does not simply occur at an individual level, but also 
at a group level: altruism might detrimental for the individual but it is beneficial for 
the group, and since groups composed just (or mainly) of selfish organisms go extinct, 
groups containing altruists will prosper. Hamilton (1964) proposed a refinement of 
this explanation of altruism in nature, using the concepts of “kin selection” predicting 
that organisms are more likely to behave altruistically towards their relatives than 
towards unconnected members of their own species. Likewise, Hamilton’s Rule 
predicts that the closer the relationship the greater the extent of altruism. The rule 
specifically states that r, the coefficient of relatedness or the probability of sharing a 
gene, must be greater than the cost-to-benefit ratio of an altruistic act: r > c/b. For 
interest’s sake the probability of sharing a gene with a brother is ¼, and with a cousin 
1/8. After Hamilton's hypothesis was conceived empirical work has plentifully 
affirmed his predictions. 
Together with altruism, cooperation is a key aspect of social evolution, since 
evolutionary processes are all based on it to some extend. Novak (2006) summarized 
                                                
8 For example in many bird species newly parents receive the help of other birds in order to raise their 
offsprings. Also, in most of the social insect colonies (such as bees and wasps, ants and termites), sterile 
workers are devoted to looking after the queen, building and protecting the nest, gather food and looking 
after the eggs and the larvae. 
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the five rules for the evolution of cooperation as follows: direct reciprocity (w > c/b, 
where w is the probability of encountering the same individual again), indirect 
reciprocity (q >c/b where q is the probability of knowing somebody’s reputation), 
spatial selection (b/c > k where k is the average number of neighbors), multi-level 
selection (b/c > 1 + n/m where n is the maximum group size and m is the total number 
of groups) and kin selection. 
 
The far-reaching research question of this chapter focuses on the possibility of 
contaminating experimental economics with biology in order to explain 
intergenerational public good provision. The topic implies the need to mimic into the 
laboratory many overlapping generations, joined by some common resource and 
characterized by some form of kin detection and selection, plus a proxy for genes 
transmission.  
 
3.2 – Method and Model 
Again, we use the Public Goods Game (PGG) to study the evolution and 
maintenance of cooperation in a setting where each of the groups can be thought of as 
a generation within a dynasty. Additionally a proxy for genes transmission is 
introduced: individuals can experience rebirth for a set, but unknown, number of 
rounds. 
 
We model the dynastic PGG as a variation of a standard PGG where there are 
two goods – one private and one public – and N individuals. Each individual i = 1, .., N 
is endowed with an amount of the private good, zi. The private good contributed (t) by 
the i-th individual is used to produce the public good following a production function Y 
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=f(Σti) where ti is the amount of private good contributed by each individual in order to 
produce Y. The production function f(Σti) represents the benefits from cooperation 
before being equally divided among all N group members. The outcome of a public 
good experiment consists of two items: a level of public good Y and a reallocation of 
the private good for each agent x1, ..., xN. Player’s i’s individual payoff, πi, equals: πi = zi - 
ti + (a+bδi) Σti, where (a+bδi) is the decomposition of the MPCR with δi being an 
individual productivity factor. If 1/N < (a+bδi) < 1 the game is a social dilemma since 
individually, each player is best off giving nothing to the public good, but collectively 
the players are best off donating their entire endowments.  
 
The spillover is modeled, simplified to only two ensuing players (i.e. Parent and 
Child), as follows: 
 
Parent Public Good (PPG) 
i = 1, .., N  
zpi: private good of parent 
tpi: private good contributed by the parent  
Y =f(Σti): production function   
 
Outcome of PPG: 
pi ’s individual payoff, πi, equals:  
πpi = zpi - tpi + β(α Σtpi ) 
Where β is the share of subject PPG payoff kept by the parent and (1-β) is the 
share transferred the child.  
Therefore the new condition for the game in order to be an intergenerational 
social dilemma is 1/βN < α< 1/ β, where 0<β<1. 
Child Public Good (CPG): 
i = 1, .., N  
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zci:  private good of child 
Z’ci: private good of child+transfer 
tci:  private good contributed by the child 
 
Outcome of CPG: 
ci ’s individual payoff, πi, equals:  
πci = z’ci - tci + β(α Σtci ) 
with z’cj= zcj +(1-β)(αΣtpi) and where β is the share of subject PPG payoff kept by 
the child and (1-β) is the share transferred to the grandchild.  Again the new condition 
for the game in order to be an intergenerational social dilemma is 1/βN < α< 1/ β, and 
0<β<1. 
In our experiment we set β = 0.9 (therefore (1-β) = 0.1) and α =0.5 which 
satisfies the newly found condition for the intergenerational social dilemma 1/βN < α< 
1/ β. It is important to highlight that our new condition shifts the lower and upper 
bounds forward compared to the standard social dilemma condition of PGG. 
 
3.2.1 – Experimental Design 
The experiment consisted of two treatments: the baseline (BT) and the 
dynasties spillover (DT). We used a between subject design: each session was 
composed by 24 participants and consisted of 15 rounds. Participants were informed 
that several rounds composed the experimental session, but the exact number was not 
specified. However the set number of rounds was 15. 
At the beginning of each session individuals were informed about their role 
during the experiment. In the BT they were presented with an envelope containing a 
card with a letter printed on it (either A, B or C). They were also presented with the 
following image, both in the instructions and in the first screen of the software 
programme, representing the structure of the game. 
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Figure 3.1 – BT Group Structure. 
 
As shown, each individual belonged to a “Letter Group” and was called to make 
a decision in turns: first individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” A, then individuals 
belonging to the “Letter Group” B, then individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” C, 
then again individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” A, then individuals belonging to 
the “Letter Group” B, then individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” C, and so on 
until the experiment reached its ending. 
In the DT they were presented with an envelope containing a colored card 
(either yellow, green, red or blue) with a letter printed on it (either A, B or C) plus a 
colored wristband (of the same color as the card) to be worn from the very beginning 
of the experiment. They were also presented with the following image, both in the 
instructions and in the first screen of the software programme, representing the 
structure of the game. 
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Figure 3.2 – DT Group Structure 
 
As shown, each individual belonged both to a “Letter Group” and a “Color 
Group” and was called to make a decision in turns: first individuals belonging to the 
“Letter Group” A, then individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” B, then individuals 
belonging to the “Letter Group” C, then again individuals belonging to the “Letter 
Group” A, then individuals belonging to the “Letter Group” B, then individuals 
belonging to the “Letter Group” C, and so on until the experiment reached its ending. 
In this treatment each “Letter Group” represented a generation, while each 
“Color Group” represented a dynasty. In order to induce and improve individual group 
identity and membership we introduced a preliminary task that each “Color Group” 
had to undertake. This consisted in submitting as many correct answers to a crossword 
as possible in 9 minutes time. The sum of the correct answers for each “Color Group” 
was multiplied by 5 ECU and paid at the end of the experiment, when also a feedback 
on the preliminary task was individually given. Both at the end of the preliminary task 
and at the end of the experiment, participants were asked to inform experimenters on 
how much they felt like they belonged to their “Color Group”. We based our question 
on both Tropp and Wright (2001) and Sani et Al. (2007) and we developed a 
continuous Inclusion of the In-group in the Self (IIS) measure. To the contrary of what 
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has been done previously (where the IIS was quantified by a single-item measure 
based on seven Venn-diagram figures) we proposed two circles – one representing the 
in-group and one representing the self – that could be overlapped to any degree that 
subjects deemed fit to represent their sense of psychological overlap with the group. 
Participants were asked to simply “drag and drop” with the mouse the self-circle 
within the boundaries of the software window. 
In addition the structure of the “Color Group” – with different subjects taking 
turns playing for their color – allowed for the recreation a phenomena called 
“perceived collective continuity” or PCC (Sani et al., 2007). Individuals tend to see their 
in-groups (i.e. Nation, extended family, ethnic group etcetera) as having temporal 
continuity, as entities that are capable to move through time (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). People therefore perceive themselves as part of the endless chain that goes 
beyond space and time. 
Individuals in both treatments were also informed that the endowment at the 
beginning of each round would be different, either given by the experimenters (BT) or 
partially originated by the outcome of the PG game in the previous round (DT).  
In particular individuals in the DT knew that the endowment was composed by 
the sum of 30 ECU plus a spillover of 10% of whatever the group in the previous round 
produced as the return from the public good, implying that only 90% was retained by 
the previous generation.  
The endowments given by the experimenters in BT were generated by means 
of a backward design. The sessions of DT ran before those of BT, so we were able to 
mirror the endowments generated in DT for BT, as a set amount, so that we could 
compare the behavior in the two treatments controlling for a potential endowment 
effect. 
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In this way we recreated a simplified intergenerational setting where 
generations played a PG game at different stages, while each dynasty was affected by 
the actions of previous generations. 
As usual in experiments on Public Goods, neutral terms have been used in both 
instructions and software, so there was no mention of any terminology linked to 
generations, dynasties or families. 
Concluding the experiment was a structured questionnaire that, besides the 
standard socio-demographic questions, included a set of 15 questions aimed at 
investigating the generational and dynastic profile of participating subjects. 
 
3.2.2 – Behavioral Predictions 
As already discussed in section 2.2.2, standard game theory predicts that, using 
backward induction, the Nash Equilibrium for a repeated PG game should be free-
riding. However countless experiments on PGG showed that such scenario is hardly 
ever achieved, even after 60 rounds. Furthermore previous literature shows that 
contributions to the PG tend to increase with higher marginal per capita returns 
(MPCR), chances of communication between subjects, homogeneity, and positive 
framing (see section 1.1).  
In addition, looking at previous experiments related to the dynastic lineage 
hypothesis, we can expect some form of increase in PG investments when the game is 
framed as an intergenerational setting. Peters et al. (2004) showed that parents and 
children contributed more to the PG when in the real family setting (compared to a 
strangers setting, as in Andreoni, 1988 and Croson, 1996). Parents also contributed 
more compared to children and kept contributing more even in groups with children 
from other families.  
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This background allows the formulation of at least two testable predictions: 
HP 1: Introducing a proxy for dynastic lineage increases the investment in the 
public good. 
HP 2: The socio-demographic background of individuals, in particular their family 
composition and status, influences the levels of public good investment. 
 
3.2.3 – Participants and Procedures 
The Experiment ran in Trento (Italy) at the Cognitive and Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. Participants were recruited 
through the CEEL online recruitment system. On the day of the experiment 
participants were accommodated in computer-equipped booths that did not allow for 
either verbal communication or visual contact. In order to avoid the use of external 
aids (such as calculators or mobile phones) during the experiment, participants were 
asked to leave their personal belongings on the side of the room. The participants were 
mainly students of University of Trento.  
A total of 96 participants (58 males and 38 females; mean age of 22.23 – min of 
20, max of 33 – with SD of 2.52) took part in the experiment, divided into 4 sessions of 
24 participants. Each treatment had two experimental sessions. 
On the day of the experiment instructions (for each corresponding treatment) 
were distributed and participants were allowed to read them individually. To establish 
and ensure common knowledge instructions were also read aloud. Furthermore, 
before the beginning of the session a questionnaire was submitted to check the 
understanding of the experimental structure. 
The experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes for BT and 90 for the DT. For 
their participation and punctuality subjects received, in addition to the result achieved 
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in the experiment, a show-up fee of 3 Euro. The cumulative payoff of the active rounds 
was converted in Euro (1 ECU = 0.03 Euro) and privately paid to each subject. On 
average, participants in BT earned 9.70 Euro (SD 1.55) and in DT 9.81 Euro (SD 1.27) 
without the payment of the preliminary task and 12.47 (SD 1.62) including it. 
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3.3 – Results 
3.3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 summarizes the average, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of the contributions to the public good and the group contribution  
in BT, DT and overall respectively. 
Table 3.1 – Average contribution to the public good. 
 
Individual Contribution Group contribution Statistic 
BT DT Overall BT DT Overall 
Mean 11.36 15.49 13.42 45.44 61.96 53.70 
SD 12.80 11.89 12.51 39.49 31.06 36.44 
Min 0 0 0 0 9 0 
Max 35 35 35 128 110 128 
 
 
RESULT 1 – Giving in dynastic treatment is greater than in the baseline 
treatment.  
Looking at all the different aspects of subject and group contribution we can 
observe a clear difference between the two treatments. At a first glance, as depicted in 
both table 3.1 and figure 3.3, it is perceptible a difference between the two treatments, 
with higher average individual and group contribution for DT, and higher SD for BT.  
Figure 3.3 – Box plot of average individual contribution in BT and DT. 
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In order to confirm such hypothesis we firstly ran two tests for normality. The 
Shapiro–Wilk test has p-value < 0.001 showing evidence that the data tested are not 
from a normally distributed population. This is confirmed by the skewness/kurtosis 
test of normality (p-value = 0.1381 and p-value = 0.0000 respectively). 
As a consequence we choose a series of non-parametric tests between 
experimental treatments that are fit for the non-normal distribution at hand. We ran a 
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the average individual contribution 
between the two treatments, confirming that there is a marginally significant 
difference between BT and DT (p-value = 0.0686). The existence of differences across 
the two experimental treatments is corroborated also by Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test comparing average group contributions in BT and DT (p-value = 
0.0147). From the output, we see that we can reject the hypothesis that the 
populations are the same at any level below 1.47%9. 
Figure 3.4 graphically depicts the trend of group average contributions for the 
rounds from 4 to 15, for BT and DT10. It is clear that the two treatments have different 
average group contributions (being those of DT higher than those of BT), but the trend 
of such data seems irregular. This is most probably due to the fact that groups were 
playing in turns and each had its very own trend of contributions, with possibly a 
restart effect playing its part into shaping group contributions. However, since our 
game is repeated, we should observe some degree of decay, even if subjects do not 
know the length of the game for sure. 
 
 
                                                
9 For the purpose of calculating the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test we calculated 
the average of contributions for each individual, agreegating therefore the observations into 48 for each 
treatment. 
10 From this point onwards and for all statistical information we do not consider rounds 1 to 3. These 
were dropped since they represented the first round for each “Letter Group” in both treatments and did 
not contain any “generation”effect. 
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Figure 3.4 – Average Group Contributions in BT and DT. 
 
 
In order to isolate restart hypothesis we summarized the average investment in 
public good per group In table 3.2 the difference between the two treatments is 
highlighted. In addition we grouped the observations in turns rather than rounds, 
where a turn clusters together sets of three rounds. Each round therefore is 
representing from the first to the fifth choice of each “Letter Group”. 
Table 3.2 – Average investment in the public good per group, in turns. 
 
 Turn 1 Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5 Overall  
BT 63.58 58.50 47.92 35.25 40.08 49.07 
DT 60.75 63.83 59.17 61.33 63.50 61.72 
Difference 2.83 -5.33 -11.25 -26.08 -23.42 -12.65 
 
RESULT 2 – Being part of a dynasty matters. Not only the investment in the 
public good is higher, but also the levels of free riding are lower. 
Looking into table 3.3, it can be seen that in the first turn subjects in DT free 
ride more than subjects in BT. However the free riding percentage constantly increase 
for subjects in BT, reaching its maximum of 35.4% in the fifth turn, while it remains 
fairly constant for subjects in DT, except for a peak of 18.8% in turn 3. Not 
coincidentally, in the third turn of BT we can also see a drop in group contributions 
(Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.3 – Percent of subjects’ free riding, in turns. 
 
 Turn 1 Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5 Overall  
BT 6.3% 16.7% 25.0% 33.3% 35.4% 23.3% 
DT 10.4% 10.4% 18.8% 12.5% 10.4% 12.5% 
Difference -4.2% 6.3% 6.3% 20.8% 25.0% 10.8% 
 
To confirm the hypothesis of lower free riding in the presence of dynasties we 
ran a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the number of free riders 
between the two treatments (in all rounds), confirming that there is a significant 
difference between BT and DT (p-value = 0.0549). At this point it is interesting to attest 
to the levels of full cooperation and compare it between the two treatments. As can be 
seen from Table 3.4 the results are reversed, with greater levels of full cooperation in 
the baseline treatment. However the trend for the two treatments shows a different 
story: while in BT the levels of full cooperation steadily decline with a downward peak 
in the fourth turn, in DT full cooperation progressively increases in each turn reaching 
its peak in the fifth turn. Coincidentally both treatments end at a 20.8% level of full 
cooperation. 
Table 3.4 – Percent of subjects fully cooperating, in turns. 
 
 Turn 1 Turn 2 Turn 3 Turn 4 Turn 5 Overall  
BT 27.1% 22.9% 20.8% 16.7% 20.8% 27.1% 
DT 6.3% 8.3% 10.4% 18.8% 20.8% 12.9% 
Difference 20.8% 14.6% 10.4% -2.1% 0.0% 8.8% 
 
Again, in order to verify that the difference between the two treatments is 
significant we ran the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test comparing the 
number of occurrences of full cooperation in BT and DT, which returned a p value of 
0.0845, showing only marginal significance, if any. 
Falling in the “dynasty effect” are the results of the continuous Inclusion of the 
In-group in the Self (IIS) measure described in section 3.2.1. We checked for IIS in DT 
at the beginning of the experimental session as well as at the end of it.  Briefly, the 
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measure of membership is given by the distance in pixels between the center of the 
circle representing the self and the one representing the “Color Group”. When the two 
circles perfectly overlap the measurement is equal to 0, any other degree of 
overlapping is greater than 0 but smaller or equal than 100, and no overlapping is 
greater than 100 up to a maximum of 736 pixels.  
Firstly a cluster analysis was run in an attempt to determine the natural 
clusters of the observed levels of membership (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). The two clusters 
show different ranges for the groups, with smaller lower and upper bounds for the 
measurement before the experimental session began. One hypothesis is that during 
the course of the experiment subjects could not reach their desired outcome for the 
self and/or the group and therefore felt less attached to their “Color Group”. To check if 
there is any relation between the measurement of the membership at the end of the 
experiment and the “Color Group” we ran a simple Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient. The Pearson’s r for the correlation between the average 
inheritance for each subject and the post-experiment measure of membership is equal 
to  -0.4216, showing that there is only a very weak negative correlation. On the other 
hand one can speculate that the preliminary “Color Group” task had an effect on the 
levels of membership perceived. Again we ran the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient, this time between the number of correct answers to the 
crossword and the pre-experiment IIS measurement. The result of -0.1844 clearly 
shows that the performance in the preliminary task did not affect the perceived IIS 
measure. However, seeing that 75% of subjects had some sort of overlapping between 
the self and the group circles, it is plausible to believe that the proxies (colored cards, 
wrist bands, software reminders) to induce group identity and membership worked at 
least to some extent. 
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Table 3.5 – Membership cluster analysis, beginning of experimental session. 
 
Min Mean Max Frequency 
0 4.56 21 18 
25 42.08 66 12 
77 99.18 123 11 
159 182.6 241 5 
369 480.5 592 2 
0 74 592 48 
 
Table 3.6 – Membership cluster analysis, end of experimental session. 
 
Min Mean Max Frequency 
0 30.85 55 20 
67 89.63 108 11 
125 155.75 201 8 
275 351.67 422 3 
592 616.17 736 6 
0 158.35 736 48 
 
3.3.2 – Socio-Demographic Profiling of Subjects 
At the end of the experiment we administered an extended socio-demographic 
questionnaire aimed at profiling subjects from a dynastic point of view. In addition to 
the standard questions (age, gender, year of birth, academic background), questions 
regarding the family composition were asked. In particular the following information 
was elicited: number of cohabiting family members, number of brothers/sisters, 
number of grandparents, distance and frequency of face-to-face interactions with 
mother, father and each grandparent. Table 3.9 depicts the dynastic profiling of 
participating subjects.  
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Table 3.7 – Dynastic profiling of subjects, by treatment. 
 
 
Cohabitating family 
members (including subject) Number of brothers/sisters 
Number of (living) 
grandparents 
BT DT BT DT BT DT # 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
0 - - - - 6 12.5% 9 18.8% 6 12.5% 11 22.9% 
1 1 2.1% - - 32 66.7% 26 54.2% 13 27.1% 11 22.9% 
2 2 4.2% 2 4.2% 8 16.7% 7 14.6% 18 37.5% 12 25.0% 
3 9 18.8% 10 20.8% 2 4.2% 4 8.3% 6 12.5% 11 22.9% 
4 26 54.2% 23 47.9% - - 2 4.2% 5 10.4% 3 6.3% 
5 8 16.7% 7 14.6% - - - - - - - - 
6 2 4.2% 4 8.3% - - - - - - - - 
7 - - 2 4.2% - - - - - - - - 
 
The most common profile of a participating subject is that of an individual 
living with other 3 family members, namely the mother, the father and a 
brother/sister, and has two living grandparents. Although the sample of our subjects is 
somewhat biased since we can expect students to be still dependent and cohabitating 
with their parents, the picture portrayed by our data fits the one given by ISTAT 
(Italian National Institute of Statistics) in his 2014 Yearly Report11.  
In Italy the numbers of couples with children are declining: currently there are 
about 8.6 million (about 320,000 less than in 2006-2007) and represent only 34.6 
percent of all households (average for years 2012-2013). More specifically, following 
the decline in marriage and fertility (average of 1.29 children per female), married 
couples with children are declining more rapidly. In the same span of time families 
with children went from 37.3 to 32.6 percent. Nowadays only one in three families in 
Italy are of the more traditional form (parents plus child/children). 
Grandparent’s role also has drastically changed due to recent demographic 
shifts, such as the already mentioned fertility decline and longevity pattern. 
Demographic forecasts for Italy for the next 30 years show an escalation of the aging 
                                                
11 Since the experiment was carried out only in Trento (Italy) we compared our data with the Italian 
National Statistics. However it would be interesting to compare the results with other Countries where 
the socio-demographic framework is either very similar or somehow distinct. 
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process, especially in the South, where in the period between 2011 and 2041 the 
proportion between individuals aged 60 to 100 and young people under the age of 15 
will more than double (going from 123 to 278). During the same period in the Nothern 
and Central Italy, the aging index12 will increase by more than one and a half times, 
going from 159 to 242. This projection of an inverse pyramid society where more 
grandparents will have contact with fewer grandchildren has led researches to 
investigate this evolving relationship. Since such trends are common to most 
industrialized Countries the results of international papers on this subject can be 
extended to the Italian case13.  
Neugarten and Weinstein (1964) in their early anthropological investigation of 
51 societies discovered that the roles of grandparents differed cross-culturally: if 
grandparents were not invest anymore in a role of authority and guidance their 
relationships with grandchildren were more kind and affectionate compared to those 
societies where economic power and status lied with the elderly. Much later studies 
(Silverstein, 2001) have highlighted that factors such as family life stage, gender, 
marital status, geographical place, ethnicity and education were amongst the most 
recurrent variables influencing grandparents-grandchildren relationships. For example 
young grandparents live closer to their grandchildren and offer practical support, such 
as baby-sitting, while older grandparents live further away and prefer supporting their 
grandchildren economically. 
Current socio-demographical shifts such as lower fertility rates and higher full-
time employment for women also affect the importance of grandparents in the 
upbringing of children, and later in life, as role models for the grandchildren they 
                                                
12 The ageing index is a composite demographic ratio, defined as the percentage between the old age 
population (over 65) and the young population (under 15). 
13 For the purpose of this experiment the most relevant findings are those that look into the influence of 
grandparents over adult grandchildren. 
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(helped) raising14. In particular this trend (of grandparents substituting parents in 
childcare duties) is the focus of not only contemporary studies, but also lobbying 
initiatives.  
As a result of grandparents being the caretakers of their grandchildren a sense 
of obligation towards each other has developed (Lumby, 2010). As grandchildren grow 
older, the relationships are more likely to evolve from care to giving advice and 
support. In addition grandparents provide a link to the past and act as sources of 
family history, heritage and traditions. Grandparents, being the link between many 
strands of the same lineage, also have an active role in keeping wider sets of relatives 
connected. 
For what concerns Italy, Putnam et al. (1993) in their overview of 25 years of 
social trends concluded that low social capital reserves produced impoverished 
communities. Social capital is the results of social cohesion that starts from the very 
basic unit of the family. If and when families are capable of teaching and transmitting 
the values trust and respect, then they produce citizens who are engaged in rich social 
networks within communities. 
It seems only plausible that, given the renewed importance of grandparents 
and their traditional role in families, individuals that have greater and better 
relationships with their grandparents are also more prone to cooperate, as a good 
member of a tight community would. 
 
                                                
14 Kennedy (2009) explained that “grandchildren tended to feel closer to their mother's parents than to 
their father's parents and that they perceived their grandparents as loving, helping and comforting and as 
role models who are important in their lives”. 
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3.3.3 – Regression Analysis 
The dependent variable of the regression analysis performed is the level of 
individual investment (contribution) to the common project (public good). The 
following fixed explanatory factors were considered: 
• Inheritance: 10% of the public good individual return that is transferred 
from the previous player in DT, or the extra endowment that each 
player received in BT; 
• Previous group contribution (groupcprev): how much the group has 
contributed as a whole in the previous turn of activity; 
• Dynasty previous contribution (dynstycprev): how much the group (in 
lineage) playing in the previous round has contributed; 
• Turn; 
• Generation. 
Furthermore, to illustrate the importance of the dynastic background of 
subjects, we included several control variables: the number of living-in family 
members (family), the number of grandparents (gp), and the frequency of the face-to-
face interaction with grandparents (freqgp). In addition we controlled for the gender 
(male) and faculty (eco). Also the interactions between the number of grandparents, 
the inheritance and the gender with DT were included. Lastly we introduced a random 
explanatory factor in order to control for the potential bias in estimation due to the 
repetition of the choices and unobservable characteristics of participants into the 
experiment.  
Table 3.7 reports the results of a Random Effects Tobit Regression. This 
specification has been chosen to account for the limits imposed in the experiment for 
the contribution choices. Also, since the initial endowment was varying in time 
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depending on the inheritance received from the previous generation (or set by 
experimenters in BT), it was necessary to standardize the levels of contribution. 
Therefore the dependent variable is still the level of individual investment 
(contribution) to the common project (public good), but it is expressed as a value 
between 0 and 1. The contribution in percentage is regressed on the explanatory 
treatment variables previously specified. 
Table 3.8 – Random Effects Tobit Regression  
(individual contributions – values between 0 and 1) 
 
Perc_Contribution Coeff. (Std. Err) 
DT -0.059  (0.224) 
Inheritance 0.042 (0.030) 
Group Previous Contribution 0.009 (0.001)*** 
Dynasty Previous Contribution 0.002 (0.001)* 
Turn -0.010 (0.177) 
Generation (Group B) -0.262 (0.098)** 
Generation (Group C) 0.010 (0.092) 
Family 0.046 (0.039) 
Grandparents -0.150 (0.096) 
Frequency Grandparents 0.036 (0.032) 
DT X grandparents 0.320 (0.130)** 
DT X frequency gp -0.046 (0.046) 
DT X inheritance -0.171 (0.049)*** 
DT X gender (male) 0.317 (0.151)** 
Male -0.120 (0.109) 
Economics -0.077 (0.084) 
0bs 78 left-censored observations at perc_contr<=0 
239 uncensored observations 
67 right-censored observations at perc_contr>=1 
Wald Chi-Square test (p-value) < 0.0001 
***p< 0.001 **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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The results of the regression show a significant positive impact of the group 
previous contribution (what the subjects in their own “Letter Group” contributed in 
the previous active round). A smaller, and less significant effect is also registered for 
the dynasty previous contribution (what the subjects belonging to the same lineage or 
“Color Group” contributed in the previous round). Greater positive and significant 
impacts are also registered in the interaction of DT with the number of grandparents, 
and gender. Significant negative influence on contribution is found for individuals 
belonging in the “Letter Group” B and a marginal negative effect is found in the 
interaction between DT and the inheritance levels.  
 
3.4 – Discussion  
This study examined the influence of dynastic lineage over investments in 
public goods in an experimental setting. During the last two decades, laboratory 
experiments have become a recognized method for testing economic theories and 
paradigms. Experimental economics has the obvious advantage to generate empirical 
information in a controlled environment that is also replicable. However, amongst 
other limitations, a standard questionnaire for collecting socio-demographic and 
economic data to administer to participating subjects is not yet available. This type of 
standard instrument would not only improve the comparability of different datasets 
and analyze the selectivity of subject pools (Gächter, 2009) but also extend the 
understanding of the influence that socio-demographic characteristics of subjects have 
over economic decision-making processes. 
As suggested by Gächter (2009), the integration of experiments into 
representative surveys would allow researchers to explore the impact of socio-
demographics on experimentally observed behavior. Since it is already a standard 
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practice amongst most researchers in the field of experimental economics to elicit 
socio-demographic information from subjects at the end of experimental sessions, it 
would be reasonable to coordinate such effort. Such surveys are relevant since they 
could provide explanatory variables for unclear decision-making processes. This 
consideration is particularly relevant for the purpose of explaining intergenerational 
public good investments: as shown in section 3.3.2 individuals with a greater number 
of (living) grandparents tend to contribute more to the common project. If an 
extended version of a standard socio-demographic questionnaire were not 
administered relevant information that explain such an important intergenerational 
dynamic would not be available.  
The experiment presented in this chapter is a first step towards the 
identification of potential intergenerational factors affecting public goods provision, 
and much remains to be understood. First and foremost future research should 
investigate whether dynastic lineage in real families is as strong as the results of this 
experiment suggested. Also future work should look into the possibility of investing in 
either a dynastic family good or a public good, similar to what has been done for local 
and global PG experiments. Another line of research could look at the same issue by 
means of a sequential dictator game, extending the work of Bahr and Requate (2007).  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This dissertation is set up to explore, from an Experimental and Behavioral 
perspective, the concept of Intergenerational and International public goods. The 
production of such long-lived and/or across-the-boarder PG depends not only on the ability 
of the members of the current cohort to cooperate, but also on the extent to which they care 
about future or neighboring cohorts. 
 
Overview, empirical findings and implications. 
 
Intergenerational and International PG have received scant attention from 
experimentalists. However some work in this direction has been already done. Chapter 1 
reviewed the literature available to date. While various researchers have already 
investigated some aspects of Intergenerational PG, there is no systematic approach to the 
topic yet. On the other hand International PG issues have been tackled organically using 
the already established tool of local vs. global PG game. This assessment of the literature 
highlighted some potential developments in the field. First and foremost it has been 
demonstrated the necessity of modeling in a simple, yet meaningful, manner the overlap of 
different generations, producing long-lived PG. 
The remainder two Chapters aimed at producing relevant experimental evidence on 
two major research questions within the general topic of the dissertation: what happens 
when a PG is produced but it benefits the young and inexperienced more then the old and 
experienced? And what are the consequences and decision-making dynamics of leaving 
part of the PG produced to future generations? 
Chapter 2, Helping Out the Young and Inexperienced: an Experimental 
Approach to Generational Heterogeneity and Redistribution in Public Good Games, 
  82 
analyzed the impact of heterogeneity in MPCR, linked to seniority, in the production of 
a PG. Although the experiment did not introduce any form of OLG structure or 
spillover mechanism, the design focused on the implications of the entry and exit of 
individuals in a cohort. This dynamic membership was linked to different returns from 
the investment in the common project. In one treatment the MPCR was held constant 
for each type of player, while in the other treatment the MPCR was decreasing in 
experience. The results showed that loosing status (i.e. having the MPCR reduced over 
the three days in which the experiment took part, in favor of the new entrants) was 
eroding the contributions towards the PG much more than being at a stable 
disadvantage. Furthermore heterogeneity created distress in finding a cooperative 
equilibrium. 
The third and last chapter, titled Grandparents Matter: Perspectives on 
Intergenerational Altruism - An Experiment on Family Dynamic Spillovers in Public 
Goods Games, focused the attention on lineage membership in PG games. To this end 
the experimental design developed across the dynastic dimension: in one treatment 
there was no recollection of any sort of family membership, while on the other we 
took plenty of care in recalling such attachment (color coding, wristbands, software 
reminders). We found that, not only the dynastic treatment (DT) produced higher 
contributions to the PG, but that it also nudged individuals to recollect their own 
dynastic framework. Results demonstrated how the actual socio-demographic 
background of experimental subjects had an effect on their contributions: in DT the 
greater the number of living grandparents, the greater the contribution to the PG. This 
specific result had two major implications: the first and most direct was that 
individuals might care more for the future cohorts when the lineage membership is 
evident (in line with evolutionary and biological findings); the second, less direct, 
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regards the necessity for Experimental Economics to review the importance of socio-
demographic questionnaires as a standardized tool for the discipline (Gächter, 2009). 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study has offered an evaluative outlook on an important topic for policy 
makers, and was conducted through computerized experiments in the laboratory. As a 
direct consequence of this methodology, the study encountered a number of limitations 
(besides the classic argument of external validity), which need to be considered.  
Firstly, this Doctoral Thesis looked only at some of the issues surrounding the 
production of international and intergenerational public goods, and has done it in a 
compartmental manner. It would be of interest to construct an experimental design that 
brings together all the relevant features of long-lived PG: dynamic membership (birth and 
death of subjects), family lineage, spillovers (carryover of the PG) and means of financing 
of the PG (borrowing from the future cohorts). In addition it would be interesting to 
investigate how individuals distribute their wealth when they are called to choose between 
investing in a PG that benefits the future generations and leaving an inheritance for their 
own descendants (public vs. private goods spillover). Also it would be of value to run 
some experimental sessions with both non-related subjects and real families. 
For what concerns international PG, which did not find a proper experimental essay 
in this dissertation, an obvious way forward would be the introduction of thresholds in 
local and global PG experiments. Another line of research could merge intergenerational 
and international public goods. In other words it would be interesting to see the behavior of 
subjects when they are called upon choosing to invest on a long-run local or global PG. 
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Appendix A: Original and Translated Instructions – 
Experiment in Chapter 2 
Note: the label [Common] identifies instructions which are common to all treatments; the label 
[BT] identifies instructions which refer exclusively to the Base Line Treatment (standard PG 
with 3 MPCR); the label [T1] identifies instructions which refer exclusively to the constant 
MPCR between days for the same Type of player and [T2] identifies instructions which refer 
exclusively to the decreasing MPCR between days for the same Type of Player. 
Further the labels [D0], [D1] and [D2] identify the day of the experiment. 
 
General Instructions  
 
ORIGINAL 
Caro Partecipante, 
Ti ringraziamo per aver deciso di partecipare a questo esperimento. Da questo momento in poi 
ti chiediamo di non comunicare con gli altri partecipanti. Se dovessi avere delle domande, ti 
preghiamo di alzare la mano e attendere che uno degli sperimentatori venga a rispondere 
privatamente alle tue domande.  
 
The Experiment  
 
[BT] L’esperimento di oggi è costituito da 20 round, ognuno dei quali è indipendente dagli altri. 
Questo significa che le decisioni prese in un round influiscono solo sui guadagni di quel round e 
non sui guadagni degli altri round. Davanti a te trovi un foglio con indicato un numero (1, 2, o 
3). Questa lettera stabilisce il tuo tipo di giocatore. Nel primo round sarai associato 
casualmente ad altri 2 partecipanti e assieme formerete un gruppo di 3 persone, una del “TIPO 
1”, una del “TIPO 2” e una del “TIPO 3”. La composizione del gruppo sarà la medesima per tutti e 
venti i round, cioè gli altri 2 partecipanti del tuo gruppo saranno sempre gli stessi. La loro 
identità non sarà mai portata a tua conoscenza. Allo stesso modo la tua identità non sarà mai 
rivelata a loro. 
 
[T1][T2] L’esperimento si svolge in tre giornate consecutive.  
 
[D0] Alla fine dell’esperimento di oggi (primo giorno) saranno estratti a sorte 12 individui  (più 
due riserve) che parteciperanno all’esperimento che si terrà domani (secondo giorno). Tra 
questi 12, alla fine dell’esperimento di domani saranno estratti a sorte 6 individui (più due 
riserve) che parteciperanno all’esperimento che si terrà dopodomani (terzo giorno) .  
 
[D1] Alla fine dell’esperimento di ieri (primo giorno) sono state estratte a sorte 12 persone  (più 
due riserve) che indichiamo con il nome “TIPO 1” e che parteciperanno all’esperimento di oggi 
(secondo giorno). A queste si aggiungono 6 nuove persone che indichiamo con il nome “TIPO 
2”. Alla fine dell’esperimento di oggi saranno estratti a sorte 6 individui (più due riserve)  tra i  
“TIPO 1”  che parteciperanno all’esperimento che si terrà domani (terzo giorno) . Mentre tutte 
le persone di “TIPO 2” parteciperanno all’esperimento che si terrà domani (terzo giorno). 
 
[D2] Alla fine dell’esperimento dell’altro ieri (primo giorno) sono state estratte a sorte 12 
persone  (più due riserve) che indichiamo con il nome “TIPO 1” e che hanno partecipato anche 
all’esperimento di ieri (secondo giorno). A queste si sono aggiunte 6 nuove persone che 
indichiamo con il nome “TIPO 2”. Alla fine dell’esperimento di ieri sono stati estratti a sorte 6 
individui (più due riserve)  tra i  “TIPO 1”  che parteciperanno all’esperimento di oggi (terzo 
giorno) . Mentre tutte le persone di “TIPO 2” parteciperanno all’esperimento di oggi (terzo 
giorno). Alle persone del “TIPO 1” e del “TIPO 2” si aggiungono oggi 6 persone che indichiamo 
con il nome “TIPO 3”. 
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[T1][T2] I tre esperimenti sono indipendenti. In altre parole i guadagni di domani non 
dipendono dai guadagni di oggi, e i guadagni di dopodomani non dipendono dai guadagni di 
oggi e domani. 
 
[T1][T2] L’esperimento di oggi è costituito da 20 round, ognuno dei quali è indipendente dagli 
altri. Questo significa che le decisioni prese in un round influiscono solo sui guadagni di quel 
round e non sui guadagni degli altri round.  
 
[D0] Nel primo round sarai associato casualmente ad altri 2 partecipanti e assieme formerete 
un gruppo di 3 persone. La composizione del gruppo sarà la medesima per tutti e venti i round, 
cioè gli altri 2 partecipanti del tuo gruppo saranno sempre gli stessi. La loro identità non sarà 
mai portata a tua conoscenza. Allo stesso modo la tua identità non sarà mai rivelata a loro. 
 
[D1] Nel primo round sarai associato casualmente ad altri 2 partecipanti e assieme formerete 
un gruppo di 3 persone, 2 del “TIPO 1”  ed una del “TIPO 2”. La composizione del gruppo sarà la 
medesima per tutti e venti i round, cioè gli altri 2 partecipanti del tuo gruppo saranno sempre 
gli stessi. La loro identità non sarà mai portata a tua conoscenza. Allo stesso modo la tua 
identità non sarà mai rivelata a loro. 
 
[BT][D2] Nel primo round sarai associato casualmente ad altri 2 partecipanti e assieme 
formerete un gruppo di 3 persone, una del “TIPO 1”, una del “TIPO 2” e una del “TIPO 3”. La 
composizione del gruppo sarà la medesima per tutti e venti i round, cioè gli altri 2 partecipanti 
del tuo gruppo saranno sempre gli stessi. La loro identità non sarà mai portata a tua 
conoscenza. Allo stesso modo la tua identità non sarà mai rivelata a loro. 
 
[COMMON] All’inizio di ogni round ti saranno assegnate 30 unità di moneta sperimentale 
(UMS). Di queste 30 UMS dovrai decidere, individualmente ed autonomamente, se e quanto 
destinare ad un progetto comune. Anche gli altri soggetti nel tuo gruppo saranno chiamati a 
esprimere la stessa scelta. Assumiamo, per comodità, che tu sia denominato A e gli altri 2 
componenti del tuo gruppo siano denominati rispettivamente B e C. Definiamo la tua 
contribuzione al progetto come CA e le contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo 
come CB e CC. 
 
[D0] Gli utili totali derivanti dal progetto sono calcolati sommando alla tua contribuzione (CA) le 
contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per 2.7. Il 
risultato sarà poi diviso equamente tra tutti e 3 i componenti del gruppo. In altre parole il tuo 
utile derivante dal progetto è calcolato sommando alla tua contribuzione (CA) le contribuzioni 
degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per alfa pari a [T1] 0.4 (=1.2 
diviso 3) [T2] 0.9 (=2.7 diviso 3). 
Ciò che deciderai di non contribuire (cioè 30 UMS – CA) verrà messo sul tuo conto personale.  
 
[D1] Gli utili totali derivanti dal progetto sono calcolati sommando alla tua contribuzione (CA) le 
contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per 2.2. Il 
risultato sarà poi diviso tra tutti e 3 i componenti del gruppo a seconda del loro TIPO.  
In altre parole il tuo utile derivante dal progetto è calcolato sommando alla tua contribuzione 
(CA) le contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per alfa.  
Alfa assume i seguenti valori: 
• [T1] 0.40 [T2] 0.65 per le persone del “TIPO 1”; e  
• [T1] 0.65 [T2] 0.90 per le persone del “TIPO 2”. 
 
[BT][D2] Gli utili totali derivanti dal progetto sono calcolati sommando alla tua contribuzione 
(CA) le contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per 1.95. 
Il risultato sarà poi diviso tra tutti e 3 i componenti del gruppo a seconda del loro TIPO.  
In altre parole il tuo utile derivante dal progetto è calcolato sommando alla tua contribuzione 
(CA) le contribuzioni degli altri 2 componenti del tuo gruppo (CB e Cc) e moltiplicandola per alfa.  
Alfa assume i seguenti valori: 
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• 0.40 per le persone del “TIPO 1”;   
• 0.65 per le persone del “TIPO 2”; e 
• 0.90 per le persone del “TIPO 3”. 
 
[COMMON]In ogni round i tuoi guadagni sono dati dalla somma delle due seguenti voci: 
- gli UMS che hai messo sul tuo conto personale (30 UMS - CA); 
- gli utili derivanti dal progetto [alfa x (CA+ CB+ CC)].  
Alla fine di ogni round ti sarà comunicato il valore delle singole contribuzioni degli altri 
membri del tuo gruppo (CB, CC), il valore della contribuzione totale del gruppo (CA+ CB+ CC) e il 
tuo guadagno finale. 
 
 
I  TUOI GUADAGNI 
[COMMON]Sarai pagato 3,00 EURO per aver partecipato ed esserti presentato in orario.  
Inoltre alla fine dell’esperimento uno dei 20 round sarà estratto a caso e ti verrà pagato il tuo 
guadagno di UMS in quel round. Ogni UMS sarà convertita in 0,20 EURO.  
Per gli individui che saranno estratti a sorte per partecipare all’esperimento domani, il 
pagamento avverrà alla fine della sessione di domani. Qualora questi individui siano estratti a 
sorte anche domani per l’esperimento di dopodomani il pagamento avverrà alla fine della 
sessione di dopodomani. Gli individui che non sono estratti per continuare con l’esperimento 
saranno retribuiti alla fine della sessione di oggi. 
Il pagamento avverrà in contanti se il guadagno è inferiore o uguale a 25,00 EURO oppure con 
bonifico bancario se il guadagno è superiore a 25,00 EURO. 
 
TRANSLATED 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. From this moment on, we ask you not to 
communicate with other participants. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and wait for one of the investigators to respond privately. 
 
The Experiment 
 
[BT] Today’s experiment consists of 20 rounds, each of which is independent of the others. This 
means that decisions made in one round only affect earnings of that round and not the 
earnings of the other rounds. In front of you there is a piece of paper with a number written on 
it (1, 2, or 3). This number sets your type of player.  
 
[T1] [T2] The experiment is carried out in three consecutive days. 
 
[D0] At the end of today’s experiment (first day) 12 individuals (plus 2 reserves) will be 
randomly drawn and thy will participate in the experiment being held tomorrow (second day). 
Among these 12, at the end of the tomorrow’s experiment another 6 individuals (plus two 
reserves) will be randomly drawn and will participate in the experiment being held tomorrow 
(third day). 
 
[D1] At the end of yesterday’s experiment (first day) 12 individuals (plus two reserves) were 
randomly selected and denoted by the name "Type 1". These individuals are participating in the 
experiment today (second day). In addition there are 6 new people denoted by the name "TYPE 
2". At the end of today’s experiment of today 6 individuals (plus two reserves) among the "type 
1" will be randomly drawn and they will participate in the experiment being held tomorrow 
(third day). All individuals labeled as "type 2" will take part in the experiment being held 
tomorrow (third day). 
 
[D2] At the end of the experiment held the day before yesterday (first day) 12 people (plus two 
reserves) denoted by the name "Type 1" were randomly selected and also participated in 
yesterday’s experiment (second day). To these individuals six new people denoted by the name 
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"TYPE 2" were added. At the end of yesterday’s experiment 6 individuals (plus two reserves) 
among the "type 1" were randomly drawn and will participate in today’s experiment (third 
day). While all individuals of "type 2" will take part in the experiment today (third day). Today 
to the individuals of the "type 1" and "type 2" are added  6 people denoted by the name "TYPE 
3". 
 
[T1] [T2] These are three independent experiments. In other words tomorrow's revenues do 
not depend on today's gains, and gains the next day do not depend on the earnings of today 
and tomorrow. 
 
[T1] [T2] The experiment today consists of 20 rounds, each of which is independent of the 
others. This means that decisions made in one round only affect the earnings of that round and 
not on the earnings of the other rounds. 
 
[D0] In the first round you will be associated randomly to other 2 participants and together you 
will form a group of three people. The composition of the group will be the same for all twenty 
rounds that means that the other two participants in your group will always be the same. Their 
identity will never be brought to your knowledge. Similarly your identity will never be 
revealed to them. 
 
[D1] In the first round you will be associated randomly to other 2 participants and together you 
will form a group of three people, two of the "Type 1" and one of the "type 2". The composition 
of the group will be the same for all twenty rounds, meaning that the other two participants in 
your group will always stay the same. Their identity will never be brought to your knowledge. 
Similarly your identity will never be revealed to them. 
 
[BT] [D2] In the first round will be associated randomly to 2 other participants and together 
you will form a group of three people, one of the "Type 1", one of the "Type 2" and the "Type 3". 
The composition of the group will be the same for all twenty rounds, meaning that the other 
two participants in your group will always be the same. Their identity will never be brought to 
your knowledge. Similarly your identity will never be revealed to them. 
 
[COMMON] At the beginning of each round you will be awarded 30 units of  experimental 
currency (UMS). Of these 30 UMS you must decide, individually and independently, whether 
and how much to allocate to a common project. The other subjects in your group will be called 
to express the same choice. We assume, for convenience, that you are called A and the other 
two members of your group are named respectively B and C. We define your contribution to 
the project as CA and the contributions of the other two members of your group as CB and CC. 
 
[D0] The total profits generated by the project are calculated by adding up to your contribution 
(CA), the contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and multiplying by 
[T1] 1.2 [T2] 2.7. The result will then be equally divided between all three members of the 
group. In other words, your profit on the project is calculated by adding to your contribution 
(CA), the contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and multiplying by 
alpha of [T1] 0.4 (= 1.2 divided by 3) [T2 ] 0.9 (= 2.7 divided by 3). 
What you decide not to contribute (30 UMS - CA) will be put on your account. 
 
[D1] The total profits generated by the project are calculated by adding up to your contribution 
(CA), the contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and multiplying by 
[T1] 1.45 [T2] 2.2. The result will then be divided between all 3 components of the group 
according to their TYPE. 
In other words, your profit on the project is calculated by adding to your contribution (CA), the 
contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and multiplying by alpha. 
Alfa takes the following values: 
• [T1] 0.40 [T2] 0.65 for the people of the "Type 1"; and 
• [T1] 0.65 [T2] 0.90 for the people of the "Type 2". 
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[BT] [D2] The total profits generated by the project are calculated by adding up to your 
contribution (CA), the contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and 
multiplying by 1.95. The result will then be divided between all 3 components of the group 
according to their TYPE. 
In other words, your profit on the project is calculated by adding to your contribution (CA), the 
contributions of the other two members of your group (CB and CC) and multiplying by alpha. 
Alfa takes the following values: 
• 0,40 for people of "Type 1"; 
• 0.65 for the people of the "Type 2"; and 
• 0.90 for the people of the "Type 3". 
 
[COMMON] In each round your earnings are the sum of the following two items: 
- The UMS that you put on your personal account (30 UMS - CA); 
- Profits accruing from the project [alpha x (CA + CB + CC)]. 
At the end of each round you will be informed of the value of individual contributions of the 
other members of your group (CB, CC), the value of the contribution of the group (CA + CB + CC) 
and your final gain. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
[COMMON] You will be paid 3.00 EURO for participating and being on time. 
Also, at the end of the experiment one of the 20 rounds will be drawn at random and you will 
be paid your UMS gain in that round. Each UMS will be converted into 0.20 EURO. 
For individuals who will be randomly selected to participate in tomorrow’s experiment, the 
payment will be at the end of tomorrow’s session. If any of these individuals are also randomly 
selected for the experiment on the day after tomorrow the payment will take place at the end 
of that session. Individuals who are not drawn to continue with the experiment will be paid at 
the end of today's session. 
Payment will be made in cash if the payoff is less than, or equal to 25.00 EURO or by bank  
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Appendix B: Original and Translated Instructions – 
Experiment in Chapter 3 
 
Note: the label [Common] identifies instructions which are common to all treatments; the label 
[BT] identifies instructions which refer exclusively to the Base Line Treatment; the label [DT] 
identifies instructions which refer to the Dynasty Treatment. 
 
General Instructions  
 
ORIGINAL 
[COMMON]Cari Partecipanti, 
Vi ringraziamo per aver deciso di prendere parte a questo esperimento. Da questo momento in 
poi vi chiediamo di non comunicare con gli altri partecipanti. Se doveste avere delle domande, 
vi preghiamo di alzare la mano e attendere che uno degli sperimentatori venga a rispondervi 
privatamente.  
 
L’ESPERIMENTO  
Ruoli e Gruppi 
[BT] Posto sul tavolo dinanzi ad ognuno di voi c’è una busta contenente un tagliando con una 
lettera stampata (A, B, C). Questo tagliando v’informa sul ruolo che dovrete ricoprire durante 
l’esperimento. 
[Ad esempio se davanti a voi c’è un tagliando con la lettera B significa che siete un giocatore del 
tipo B.] 
 
[DT] Posto sul tavolo dinanzi ad ognuno di voi c’è una busta contenente un tagliando colorato 
(giallo, verde, rosso o blu) con una lettera stampata (A, B, C). Questo tagliando v’informa sul 
vostro colore e sul ruolo che dovrete ricoprire durante l’esperimento. 
[Ad esempio se davanti a voi c’è un tagliando rosso con la lettera B significa che appartenete al 
gruppo colore rosso e siete un giocatore del tipo B]. Inoltre nella stessa busta c’è anche un 
braccialetto con il colore che vi è stato assegnato: vi chiediamo d’indossarlo sin da questo 
momento.  
L’esperimento di oggi è costituito da due parti.  
La prima consiste in un compito preliminare (vedi sezione 1.3 - Task del compito preliminare). 
 
[BT] L’esperimento è costituito da un certo numero di round, ognuno dei quali è indipendente 
dagli altri. Questo significa che le decisioni prese in un round influiscono solo sui guadagni di 
quel round che e non sui guadagni dei round successivi. 
[DT] L’esperimento di oggi è costituito da due parti.  
La prima consiste in un compito preliminare (vedi sezione 1.3 - Task del compito preliminare). 
La seconda invece è costituita da un certo numero di round, ognuno dei quali è dipendente 
dagli altri. Questo significa che le decisioni prese in un round influiscono sia sui guadagni di 
quel round che sui guadagni di tutti i round successivi. 
 
[COMMON] In ogni round parteciperanno tra loro solo gli individui di un certo tipo (A o B o C). 
Nel primo Round parteciperanno solo gli individui del tipo A (GRUPPO A), nel secondo solo gli 
individui del tipo B (GRUPPO B), nel terzo round solo gli individui del tipo C (GRUPPO C). Nel 
quarto round parteciperà nuovamente solo il GRUPPO A, nel quinto nuovamente solo il 
GRUPPO B, e nel sesto round nuovamente solo il GRUPPO C, e via dicendo fino alla fine 
dell’esperimento. 
 
[DT] Anche la composizione del “GRUPPO COLORE” (un individuo del tipo A, uno del tipo B e 
uno del tipo C) sarà la medesima per tutti i round, cioè gli altri due membri del tuo “GRUPPO 
COLORE” rimarranno sempre gli stessi.  
L’identità degli altri membri del tuo “GRUPPO COLORE” e del tuo “GRUPPO LETTERA” non sarà 
mai portata a tua conoscenza. Allo stesso modo la tua identità non sarà mai rivelata a loro. 
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[BT] La composizione del “GRUPPO LETTERA” (giocatori del tipo A, B o C) sarà la medesima per 
tutti i round, cioè gli altri 3 membri del tuo “GRUPPO LETTERA” saranno sempre gli stessi. 
L’identità degli altri membri del tuo “GRUPPO LETTERA” non sarà mai portata a tua conoscenza. 
Allo stesso modo la tua identità non sarà mai rivelata a loro. 
 
[BT] Figura 1 – Struttura dei Gruppi Lettera e Ruoli dei partecipanti. 
La Figura 1 illustra la struttura dei “GRUPPI LETTERA” e dei Ruoli durante i round 
dell’esperimento. Vi chiediamo di osservarla attentamente per qualche secondo e d’identificare 
il vostro ruolo all’interno della struttura dei “GRUPPI LETTERA”. 
Ricapitolando: ogni giocatore appartiene a un GRUPPO LETTERA (GRUPPO A, 
GRUPPO B, GRUPPO C). L’esperimento è costituito da un certo numero di round e 
in ogni round giocano solamente gli  individui di un certo GRUPPO LETTERA. 
 
 
[DT] Figura 1 – Struttura dei Gruppi Colore, dei Gruppi Lettera e Ruoli dei 
partecipanti.  
La Figura 1 illustra la struttura dei “GRUPPI COLORE”, dei “GRUPPI LETTERA” e dei Ruoli durante 
i round dell’esperimento. Vi chiediamo di osservarla attentamente per qualche secondo e 
d’indentificare il vostro ruolo all’interno della struttura dei “GRUPPI COLORE” e “GRUPPI 
LETTERA” 
Ricapitolando: ogni giocatore appartiene a un GRUPPO COLORE (GRUPPO GIALLO, 
GRUPPO VERDE, GRUPPO ROSSO o GRUPPO BLU) e a un GRUPPO LETTERA 
(GRUPPO A, GRUPPO B, GRUPPO C). L’esperimento è costituito da un certo 
numero di round e in ogni round giocano solamente gli  individui di un certo 
GRUPPO LETTERA. 
Task del compito preliminare 
Prima di cominciare con il task dell’esperimento a ogni GRUPPO COLORE è chiesto di 
completare un cruciverba.  
A turno, ogni membro di un GRUPPO COLORE ha a disposizione tre minuti per completare 
quante più definizioni del cruciverba possibili.  
Al termine dei tre minuti disponibili per ogni individuo uno sperimentatore passerà a 
raccogliere il cruciverba per passarlo all’individuo successivo del proprio GRUPPO COLORE.  
L’ordine con cui è passato il cruciverba è il seguente:  
individuo A ! individuo B ! individuo C  
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Ciascun membro del GRUPPO COLORE sarà retribuito con 5 UMS per ogni definizione corretta 
data dal GRUPPO COLORE nel suo insieme (quindi indipendentemente da chi ha dato la 
definizione corretta all’interno del GRUPPO COLORE). Il risultato del task preliminare di ogni 
GRUPPO COLORE sarà comunicato al momento del pagamento finale (alla fine della sessione 
odierna). 
 
Task dell ’esperimento 
[DT] Prima di cominciare il task dell’esperimento e subito dopo aver terminato tutti i round vi 
sarà richiesto di esprimere quanto vi sentite parte del vostro “GRUPPO COLORE”. 
 
[COMMON] All’inizio di ogni round saranno assegnate un certo numero (almeno 30) di unità di 
moneta sperimentale (UMS) a ogni membro del “GRUPPO LETTERA” attivo durante quel round. 
L’ammontare di UMS può variare di round in round, quindi vi chiediamo di prestare attenzione 
al numero di UMS assegnate di volta in volta. 
Di queste UMS ogni membro del gruppo attivo dovrà decidere, individualmente e 
autonomamente, se e quanto destinare a un progetto comune. Anche gli altri soggetti nel 
GRUPPO LETTERA attivo saranno chiamati a esprimere la stessa scelta.  
Assumiamo, per comodità, che tu sia un membro attivo denominato X e gli altri 3 componenti 
del tuo gruppo siano denominati rispettivamente Y, Z e W. Definiamo la tua contribuzione al 
progetto come CX e le contribuzioni degli altri 3 componenti del tuo gruppo come CY , CZ e Cw. 
Gli utili totali derivanti dal progetto sono calcolati sommando alla tua contribuzione (CX) le 
contribuzioni degli altri 3 componenti del tuo gruppo (CY CZ Cw) e moltiplicandola per 2. Il 
risultato sarà poi diviso equamente tra tutti e 4 i componenti del gruppo.  
In altre parole l’utile individuale lordo derivante dal progetto è calcolato sommando alla tua 
contribuzione (CX) le contribuzioni degli altri 3 componenti del tuo gruppo (CY CZ Cw) e 
moltiplicandola per alfa pari a 0.5 (=2 diviso 4). 
Ciò che deciderai di non contribuire (cioè almeno 30 UMS – CX) verrà messo sul tuo conto 
personale.  
 
[DT] Dipendenza tra Round 
Come già ricordato l’esperimento di oggi è costituito da un certo numero di round, ognuno dei 
quali è dipendente dagli altri. Questo significa che le decisioni prese in un round influiscono sia 
sui guadagni di quel round che sui guadagni di tutti i round successivi. 
In ogni round in cui sei attivo i tuoi guadagni sono dati dalla somma delle due seguenti voci: 
- gli UMS che hai messo sul tuo conto personale (almeno 30 UMS - CX); 
- gli utili derivanti dal progetto [alfa x (CY +CZ +Cw+ Cx)].  
Alla quale è sottratta la seguente voce: 
- gli utili derivanti dal progetto [alfa x (CY +CZ +Cw+ Cx)] moltiplicati per una percentuale 
pari al 10% , ovvero la quota trasmessa al membro del tuo GRUPPO COLORE nel round 
successivo. 
[Ad esempio se siete un partecipante del tipo B e un membro del GRUPPO COLORE ROSSO 
lascerete il 10% del vostro guadagno derivante dal progetto comune al soggetto del tipo C della 
vostro stesso GRUPPO COLORE ROSSO.] 
Questo significa che, escluso il primo round, a ogni round successivo l’effettivo ammontare di 
UMS disponibili per ciascun giocatore attivo è pari alle UMS assegnate dagli sperimentatori più 
la quota trasmessa dal membro del proprio “GRUPPO COLORE” che ha partecipato al round 
precedente. 
Alla fine di ogni round in cui sei attivo ti sarà comunicato il valore delle singole contribuzioni 
degli altri membri del tuo “GRUPPO LETTERA” (CY CZ Cw), il valore della contribuzione totale del 
“GRUPPO LETTERA” (CY +CZ +Cw+ Cx), il valore trasmesso al membro del tuo “GRUPPO COLORE” 
che giocherà nel round successivo e il tuo guadagno netto finale.  
Le informazioni comunicate ai membri inattivi di ogni “GRUPPO COLORE” saranno solo il valore 
della contribuzione del membro del proprio “GRUPPO COLORE” e il valore trasmesso al 
membro del proprio “GRUPPO COLORE” che giocherà nel round successivo. 
Inoltre sarà fornito lo storico a scalare di questi risultati alla fine di ogni round. 
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[BT] In ogni round in cui sei attivo i tuoi guadagni sono dati dalla somma delle due seguenti 
voci: 
- gli UMS che hai messo sul tuo conto personale (30 UMS - CX); 
- gli utili derivanti dal progetto [alfa x (CY +CZ +Cw+ Cx)].  
Alla fine di ogni round in cui sei attivo ti sarà comunicato il valore delle singole contribuzioni 
degli altri membri del tuo “GRUPPO LETTERA” (CY CZ Cw), il valore della contribuzione totale del 
“GRUPPO LETTERA” (CY +CZ +Cw+ Cx), e il tuo guadagno netto finale.  
 
I  TUOI GUADAGNI 
[COMMON] Nota bene: tutti gli importi durante tutto l’esperimento s’intendono arrotondati 
per difetto se il primo decimale è minore o uguale a 5, o per eccesso altrimenti. 
Sarai pagato 3,00 EURO per aver partecipato ed esserti presentato in orario.  
Inoltre alla fine dell’esperimento sarà calcolato il tuo guadagno cumulativo al tuo ultimo round 
attivo.  
[DT] Sarai inoltre pagato per il task preliminare con 5 UMS per ogni definizione corretta del 
cruciverba data dal tuo “GRUPPO COLORE”. 
[COMMON] Ogni UMS sarà convertita in 0,03 EURO.  
 
TRANSLATED 
[COMMON] Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. From this moment on, we ask you not to 
communicate with other participants. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and wait for one of the investigators to respond privately. 
 
The Experiment 
Roles and Groups 
[BT] Placed on the table, right in front of each of you there is an envelope containing a coupon 
with a printed letter (A, B, C). This coupon informs you about the role that you will play during 
the experiment. 
[For example, if in front of you there is a coupon with the letter B it means that you are a type B 
player]. 
 
[DT] Placed on the table, right in front of each of you there is an envelope containing a colored 
coupon (yellow, green, red or blue) with a printed letter (A, B, C). This coupon informs you 
about your color and the role that you will play during the experiment. 
[For example, if in front of you there is a red coupon with the letter B it means that you belong 
to the red group and a type B player]. In the same envelope you will also find a wristband of the 
same color that you have been assigned: we kindly ask you to wear it from now onwards. 
 
[BT] The experiment consists of a given number of rounds, each of which is independent from 
the others. This means that decisions you make in one round only affect earnings of that very 
same round and not the earnings of later rounds. 
[DT] Today’s experiment consists of two parts. 
The first is a preliminary task (see section 1.3 - Task of the preliminary task). 
The second one consists of a given number of rounds, each of which is dependent on others. 
This means that decisions made in one round affect both the gains of that round and the 
earnings of later rounds. 
 
[COMMON] In each round individuals of a certain type (A or B or C) will be active and making 
decisions. In the first round only individuals of type A (GROUP A) will participate, in the second 
only individuals of type B (GROUP B), in the third round only individuals of the type C (GROUP 
C). In the fourth round again only GROUP A will participate, in the fifth again only to GROUP B, 
and in the sixth round again only GROUP C, and so on until the end of the experiment. 
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[DT] The composition of the "COLOR GROUP" (one individual of type A, one type B and one type 
C) will be the same for all rounds, meaning that the other two members of your "COLOUR 
GROUP" will always remain the same. 
The identities of the other members of your "COLOUR GROUP" and your "LETTER GROUP" will 
never be brought to your knowledge. Similarly your identity will never be revealed to them. 
 
[BT] The composition of the "LETTER GROUP" (players of type A, B or C) will be the same for all 
rounds, that is, the other three members of your "LETTER GROUP" will always be the same. The 
identities of the other members of your "LETTER GROUP" will never be brought to your 
knowledge. Similarly your identity will never be revealed to them. 
 
 
[BT] Figure 1 - Structure of Letter Groups and Roles of the participants. 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the "LETTER GROUP " and roles during the rounds of the 
experiment. We ask you to carefully observe it for a few seconds and identify your role within 
the structure of the "LETTER GROUP ". 
In summary: each player belongs to a LETTER GROUP (GROUP A, GROUP B, GROUP C). The 
experiment consists of a given number of rounds and in every round only the individuals of a 
certain LETTER GROUP are playing. 
 
[DT] Figure 1 - Structure of the Color Groups, Letter Groups and Roles of participants. 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the "COLOR GROUP", the "LETTER GROUP" and roles during 
the rounds of the experiment. We kindly ask you to carefully observe it for a few seconds and 
indentify of your role within this structure. 
In summary: each player belongs to a COLOR GROUP (YELLOW GROUP, GREEN GROUP, RED 
GROUP, or BLUE GROUP ) and a LETTER GROUP (GROUP A, GROUP B, GROUP C). The experiment 
consists of a certain number of rounds and in every round only the individuals of a certain 
LETTER GROUP are going to play. 
Preliminary task: 
Before starting with the experiment each COLOR GROUP is asked to complete a crossword 
puzzle. 
Taking turns, each member of a COLOR GROUP has three minutes to complete as many 
definitions of the crossword as possible. 
At the end of the three minutes available for each individual an experimenter will collect the 
crossword and pass it next to the individual of the same COLOR GROUP. 
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The order in which the crossword is passed along is the following: 
Individual A  → Individual B → individual C 
Each member of the COLOR GROUP will be paid with 5 UMS for each correct definition given by 
COLOR GROUP as a whole (so regardless of who gave the correct definition in the COLOR 
GROUP). The result of the preliminary task of each COLOR GROUP will be notified at the time of 
the final payment (at the end of today's session). 
 
1.3 - Experiment 
[DT] Before beginning the experiment and after finishing it you will be asked to express how 
much you feel part of your "COLOUR GROUP". 
 
[COMMON] At the beginning of each round each member of the active “LETTER GROUP” will 
receive (at least 30) units of experimental currency (UMS). The amount of UMS may vary from 
round to round, so we ask you to pay attention to the number of UMS assigned from time to 
time. 
Of these UMS every member of the active group will have to decide, individually and 
autonomously, whether and how much to allocate to a common project. The other active 
parties in the “LETTER GROUP” will be called to make the same choice. 
 
[DT] 1.3 - Dependence between rounds 
As already mentioned, the experiment consists of a set number of rounds, each of which is 
dependent on others. This means that decisions made in one round affect both the gains of that 
round and the earnings of later rounds. 
In each round where you are active your earnings are the sum of the following two items: 
- The UMS that you put on your personal account (30 UMS – Cx); 
- Profits accruing from the project [alpha x (Cx + Cy + Cz+ CW)]. 
Which is reduced by the following entry: 
- Profits accruing from the project [alpha x (Cx + Cy + Cz+ CW)] multiplied by a percentage equal 
to 10%, or the proportion sent to the member of your GROUP COLOR in the next round. 
[For example, if you are a participant of type B and a member of the RED GROUP you will leave 
10% of your gain from the common project to the type C individual of your own RED GROUP]. 
This means that, excluding the first round, in each subsequent round the actual amount of UMS 
available for each active player is equal to the UMS assigned by experimentes plus the portion 
transmitted by the member of its "COLOR GROUP" that was active in the previous round. 
At the end of each round in which you are active you will get feedback on the value of the 
individual contributions of the other members of your "GROUP LETTER" (Cy Cz CW), the value of 
the total contribution of the "GROUP LETTER" (Cx + Cy + Cz+ CW) The value sent to the member of 
your "COLOUR GROUP" that will play in the next round and your net gain final. 
The feedback provided for inactive members of each "COLOR GROUP" will only consist of the 
value of the contribution of the member of its "COLOR GROUP" and the value sent to the 
member of his own "COLOR GROUP" that will play in the next round. 
Previous rounds results will be also reported at the end of each round. 
 
[BT] In each round you are active your earnings consist of the sum of the following two items: 
- The UMS that you put on your personal account (30 UMS – Cx); 
- Profits accruing from the project [alpha x (Cx + Cy + Cz+ CW)]. 
At the end of each round in which you are active you will get feedback on the value of the 
individual contributions of the other members of your "GROUP LETTER" (Cy Cz CW), the value of 
the total contribution of the "GROUP LETTER" (Cx + Cy + Cz+ CW), and your net final gain. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
[COMMON] Please note that all amounts throughout the experimentare rounded down when 
the first decimal is less than or equal to 5, or otherwise they are rounded up. 
You will be paid 3.00 EURO for participating and being on time. 
At the end of the experiment we will calculate your cumulative gain to your last active round. 
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[DT] You will also be paid for the preliminary task with 5 UMS for each correct definition of 
crossword given by your "COLOUR GROUP". 
[COMMON] Each UMS will be converted into 0.03 EURO. 
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Appendix C: Ex-Post Questionnaire – Experiment in 
Chapter 3 
 
1 - In which faculty are you enrolled? 
(Economics/ Humanities/ Engineering/ Law/ Physics and Mathematics/ Sociology or 
Psychology/ Other Natural Sciences/ Other Social Sciences/ not a student) 
 
2 - In which year of studies are you enrolled? 
(first year/ second/ third/ out-of-due date/ master student/ not a student) 
 
3 - Which is your gender? 
 (female/ male) 
 
4 - In which year were you born? 
 
5 - How mamy members make up your family? (currently cohabiting) 
(1 to 10) 
 
6 - How may brothers or sisters do you have? 
(1 to 4) 
 
7 - How many living grandparendts do you have? 
(1 to 4) 
 
For each parent and grandparent please indicate the following: 
8 – Distance in Km (living together / <1km / 1-16 km / >16 km / overseas / not applicable) 
9 – Frequency of face-to-face interactions (daily / weekly / monthly / yearly / not applicable) 
